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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of dark pools on price discovery (the efficiency of prices on stock
exchanges to aggregate information). Assets are traded in either an exchange or a dark pool, with the dark
pool offering better prices but lower execution rates. Informed traders receive noisy and heterogeneous signals
about an asset’s fundamental. We find that informed traders use dark pools to mitigate their information
risk and there is a sorting effect : in equilibrium, traders with strong signals trade in exchanges, traders with
moderate signals trade in dark pools, and traders with weak signals do not trade. As a result, dark pools
have an amplification effect on price discovery. That is, when information precision is high (information risk
is low), the majority of informed traders trade in the exchange hence adding a dark pool enhances price
discovery, whereas when information precision is low (information risk is high), the majority of the informed
traders trade in the dark pool hence adding a dark pool impairs price discovery. The paper reconciles the
conflicting empirical evidence and produces novel empirical predictions. The paper also provides regulatory
suggestions with dark pools on current equity markets and in emerging markets.
1 Introduction
Over the years, the world financial system has experienced a widening of equity trading
venues, among which dark pools have rapidly grown in popularity. The market share of
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dark pools in the US has grown from 7.51% in 2008 to 16.57% in 2015.1 In contrast with a
traditional stock exchange, dark pools do not publicize information about their orders and
price quotations before trade. Unlike a stock exchange in which prices are formed to clear the
buy and sell orders, a typical dark pool does not form such prices: it executes orders using
prices derived from the stock exchanges. Those dark pools do not contribute to the process of
information aggregation in the exchange, and hence they do not offer price discovery. Price
discovery (i.e., the process and efficiency of prices aggregating information about assets’
values) is essential to achieving the confidence of a broad community of market participants
and ensuring the efficiency of capital markets. Therefore, the question of whether dark
pool trading will harm price discovery has become a rising concern and matter of debate for
regulators and industry practitioners.2 Academic research, for its part, has yielded conflicting
results. Ye (2011) predicts that, in theoretical studies, the addition of a dark pool strictly
harms price discovery. By contrast, Zhu (2014) predicts that dark pools strictly improve
price discovery. Empirically, there are findings that support each of the different predictions.
This paper investigates the question whether dark pool trading will harm price discov-
ery. In the model, there are informed speculators and uninformed liquidity traders. More
specifically, informed traders have heterogeneous private signals, with the distribution of
these signals determined by an information precision level. Uninformed liquidity traders
have heterogeneous demands for liquidity. Both types of traders choose among three op-
tions: a) trade in an exchange, b) trade in a dark pool, or c) do not trade (delay trade). The
exchange is modeled as market makers posting bid-ask prices and guaranteeing execution,
whereas the dark pool is modeled as a crossing-mechanism that uses the average of bid and
ask (mid-price) in the exchange to execute orders (if there are more buy orders than sell
orders, buy orders are executed probabilistically, with some buy orders not executed, and
vice versa).
We find a novel amplification effect of dark pools on price discovery: price discovery in the
exchange will be enhanced when traders’ information precision is high and will be impaired
when traders’ information precision is low. The results help to reconcile the seemingly
contradictory empirical findings about dark pool impact on the market and generate novel
empirical predictions regarding the information content of dark pool trades, dark pool market
share, and their relationships with exchange spread. We identify that information structure
(information precision) is one key variable in determining the informational efficiency (price
1Rosenblatt Securities: Let There Be Light, January 2016 Issue.
2For example, as remarked by the SEC Commissioner Kara M. Stein before the Securities Traders Associ-
ation’s 82nd Annual Market Structure Conference in Sep. 2015, “As more and more trading is routed to dark
venues that have restricted access and limited reporting, I am concerned that overall market price discovery
may be distorted rather than enhanced.” According to “An objective look at high-frequency trading and
dark pools,” a report released by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015), “Dark pools may harm the overall price
discovery process, particularly in a security in which a significant portion of that security’s trade volume is
in the pools.”
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discovery) when markets are fragmented by dark pools. We show that the results have
immediate policy implications for enhancing price discovery in equity markets and dark pool
usage in emerging economies. We also provide a discussion regarding the possible measures
of markets’ information precision.
The intuition of the amplification effect is as follows. First, we show that, in equilib-
rium, there is a sorting effect : for informed traders, those with strong signals trade in the
exchange, those with modest signals trade in the dark pool, and those with weak signals do
not trade. For uninformed liquidity traders, those with high liquidity demand trade in the
exchange, those with modest liquidity demand trade in the dark pool, and those with low
liquidity demand delay trade. The sorting effect is derived from the trade-off of trading dark
pools: dark pools provide better prices than exchanges, but this is offset by a higher non-
execution probability. Therefore, amongst informed traders, those with strong signals prefer
an exchange because they are very confident about making profits and desire a guaranteed
execution more than a better price; those with moderate signals prefer a dark pool because
they are less confident about making profits and desire a better price more than execution;
and finally, those with weak signals prefer not to trade because they are unconfident about
making profits. A similar argument holds for liquidity traders.
Second, we show that the amplification effect holds as a result of the sorting effect. Since
different information precision levels result in different distributions in the strengths of signals
and hence different venue choices for the majority of the informed traders, they cause different
dark pool impacts on price discovery. When information precision is high, the majority of
informed traders receive strong signals and prefer an exchange. Therefore, adding a dark
pool attracts only a small fraction of informed traders, compared with the liquidity traders,
leaving a higher informed-to-uninformed ratio (i.e., relative ratio of informed and uninformed
traders) in the exchange and hence improving price discovery in the exchange. In contrast,
when information precision is low, the majority of informed traders receive modest signals
and prefer a dark pool. Therefore a dark pool would attracts a higher fraction of informed
traders, compared with the liquidity traders, leaving a lower informed-to-uninformed ratio
in the exchange and hence impairing price discovery in the exchange.
This paper points out an important function of dark pools not yet discussed in the
existing literature: dark pools help informed traders mitigate their information risk, that is,
the loss that is attributable to wrong information. When traders’ information is relatively
weak (meaning there is a higher probability that it is wrong), they face a high risk of losing
money in trading. Dark pools provide those traders a perfect “buffer zone” – a place that
strictly lowers their information risk. This function of dark pools is only present, however,
when traders have a noisy information structure.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to introduce a noisy information
structure in a fragmented market to study dark pools and price discovery. Examining the
noisiness in information is of essential importance, not only because it is much more realistic
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than assuming perfect information, but also because it reveals the process of price discovery
by identifying the motivations of traders’ choices. As a result, our predictions are more
robust in the sense that the sorting and amplification effects hold in every equilibrium. In
contrast, the current theoretical literature assumes that all informed traders have perfectly
precise information. This obscures trading motivations and induces instability in the results.
For example, Zhu (2014) studies some equilibria in which dark pools improve price discovery,
but there may exist other equilibria in his model in which dark pools harm discovery. Yet,
Zhu (2014) does not discuss these equilibria.
Our findings have immediate policy implications for the ongoing debate over dark pool
usage. Our findings imply that, in contrast with current literature, there is no uniform im-
pact that dark pools have on price discovery and other measures of market quality. Dark pool
activity and its impacts display significant cross-sectional variation and should be evaluated
differently across various economic environments. Concrete suggestions for regulators to en-
hance pricing efficiency include: (i) identifying firm characteristics and monitoring dark pool
trades in firms that are likely to have a negative dark pool impact, such as high R&D firms,
young firms, small firms, and less analyzed firms, (ii) facilitating information transmission
and processing, enhancing accounting and reporting disclosure systems, and improving the
efficiency of the judicial systems and law enforcement against insider trading, and (iii) being
cautious in emerging markets with regards to dark pool trading, given that most emerging
markets are regulated by poor legal systems that lack implemental power against insider
trading and have a low precision in information disclosure. A more detailed discussion is
provided in Section 6.3.
Our study also produces testable predictions and helps to reconcile the seemingly contra-
dictory results in the current empirical literature. One of the predictions that could motivate
empirical and regulatory concerns is how much dark pool trades can forecast price move-
ments. We predict that the information content of dark pool trades has an inverted U-shape
relationship with the liquidity level (exchange spread), implying that assets with modest
liquidity have the highest information content in their dark pool trades, whereas the most
liquid and illiquid assets have the lowest information content in their dark pool trades. There
are also some predictions which coincide with current theoretical literature. For example,
dark pool usage also has an inverted U-shape association with exchange spread. Dark pools
create additional liquidity for the market. A more detailed discussion is in Section 6.2.
Related Work: There is a large collection of studies that examines information asym-
metry and price discovery in financial markets, in both the theoretical and empirical fields.
In theoretical studies, a large set of papers analyze non-fragmented markets, including the
two pioneering works in price discovery, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985).
Other studies examine fragmented lit markets, for example Viswanathan and Wang (2002),
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), and Hasbrouck (1995). There are a handful of papers that
study information asymmetry in a market fragmented by lit and dark venues (see, e.g., Hen-
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dershott and Mendelson 2000, Degryse et al. 2009, Buti et al. 2011a). Yet, these models
assume either non-freedom of choice for traders or exogenous prices. Our study, on the other
hand, considers free venue selection for traders and endogenous prices. This paper is closely
related to Zhu (2014) whose trading protocols are the same as ours. But unlike Zhu (2014)
who considers an exact information structure, we examine a noisy information structure.
Under this noisy information structure, we predict different results in price discovery and
other measures from Zhu (2014). When the informational noise is absent in our model (i.e.,
information noise converges to zero), our prediction of price discovery coincides with Zhu
(2014)’s. Our paper is also related but divergent from Ye (2011). Whereas our model con-
siders free selection of traders, Ye (2011) assumes that uninformed traders are not subject to
free-choice between different venues, and hence the corresponding piece of the pricing mech-
anism is missing. In our model, if we fix the choices of uninformed traders and only allow
informed traders to choose between venues, our prediction also coincides with Ye (2011).
Empirical works report conflicting results regarding dark pool impact on price discovery.
These results are within the predictions of our study. For example, Buti et al. (2011b),
Jiang et al. (2012), and Fleming and Nguyen (2013) support an improvement for price
discovery with dark trading, while Hatheway et al. (2013), and Weaver (2014) discover a
diminishment in price informativeness. Also, Hendershott and Jones (2005) find a negative
impact for dark trading on price discovery, while Comerton-Forde and Putnin¸s˘ (2015) find
that, cross-sectionally, dark pool trading improves price discovery when the proportion of
non-block dark trades are low (below 10%, suggesting a low fraction of informational content)
and harms price discovery when the proportion of non-block dark trades is high.
There are also other empirical studies that focus on dark pool operation and other mea-
sures of market quality. Some papers analyze the information content of dark pool trades.
For example Peretti and Tapiero (2014) find that dark trades can predict price movement.
Some study the trade-offs of dark trading. For example, Gresse (2006), Conrad et al. (2003),
Næs and Ødegaard (2006) , and Ye (2010) study the execution probability in dark pools.
Another category studies the association between dark trading and the exchange spread.
My study predicts the same inverted U-shape as Ray (2010) and Preece (2012). My study
also suggests a cross-sectional variance and provides insights in explaining the contradictory
results reported in other papers. For example ASIC (2013), Comerton-Forde and Putnin¸s˘
(2015), Degryse et al. (2015), Hatheway et al. (2013), and Weaver (2014) find a positive
association while O’Hara and Ye (2011) and Ready (2014) find a negative association be-
tween dark pool market share and exchange spread. Others find cross-sectional differences
(see, e.g., Nimalendran and Ray 2014, Buti et al. 2011b). A more detailed discussion of
the relationship between our predictions and the current empirical literature is provided in
Section 6.2.
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2 Dark Pools: An Overview
Over the last decade, numerous trading platforms have emerged to compete with the in-
cumbent exchanges. Today, in the U.S. investors can trade equities in approximately 300
different venues. According to TABB (Oct. 2015),3 as of June 2015, there are 11 exchanges,
40 active dark pools, a handful of ECNs, and numerous broker-dealer platforms that are
operating as equity trading venues in the U.S. 4.
Among those venues, dark pools are a type of equity trading venue that does not publicly
disseminate the information about their orders, best price quotations, and identities of trad-
ing parties before and during the execution.567 The term “dark” is so named for this lack
of transparency. Dark pools emerged as early as the 1970s as private phone-based networks
between buy-side traders (See Degryse et al. (2013)). In the early days, the success of these
trading venues was limited, but this has changed substantially in the last decade. Dark
pools have experienced a rapid growth of trading activity in the U.S., Europe and Asia-
Pacific area. Figure 1 shows the annual data on the market share of dark pool trading as of
the consolidated volume in the U.S., Europe, and Canada, updated to 2015.8 According to
the data, the U.S. market share of dark pools increased from about 7.51% in 2008 to 16.57%
in 2015. The dark pool market shares in Europe and Canada are less, but they exhibit
the same growth trend. In Australia, according to the Australian Securities & Investments
Commission (ASIC 2013), as of June 2015 dark liquidity consists of 26.2% of total value that
traded in Australian equity market.9
One reason behind the rapid growth of dark pool trading is the technology development in
electronic trading algorithms. Advances in technology have made it easier to automatically
3 “US Equity Market Structure: Q2-2015 TABB Equity Digest,” TABB Group, Oct. 2015.
4In Europe, according to Gomber and Pierron (2010) there are around 32 dark pools operating in equity
markets. In Australia, from ASIC (2013), there are 20 dark trading venues operating.
5Although the information about orders are hidden before trade, the after executed trades are not:
executed trades are recorded to the consolidate tape right after the trade. SEC requires reporting of OTC
trades in equity securities within 30 seconds of execution. Also, dark pools are required to report weekly
aggregate volume information on a security-by-security basis to FINRA.
6SEC Reg NMS Rule 301 (b) (3) requires all alternative trading systems (ATSs) that execute more than
5% of the volume in a stock to publish its best-priced orders to the consolidated quote system. However, it
only applies if the ATS distributes its orders to more than one participant. If it does not provide information
about its orders to any participants, it is exempt from the quote rule.
7Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) are registered as a type of ATS. But unlike dark pools,
ECNs display orders in the consolidated quote stream.
8We estimated Canadian dark pool market share from “Report of Market Share by Marketplace–Historical
(2007-2014),” IIROC, Aug 2015, “Report of Market Share by Marketplace (historical 2015–Present),” IIROC,
May, 2016. Precisely, we estimate the market share of the following 4 dark pools operating in Canada:
Liquidnet, Matchnow, Instinet, and SigmaX Canada.
9Australian Securities & Investments Commission, “Equidity Market Data,” June 2015. The number
contains 12% block size dark liquidity and 14.1% non-block size dark liquidity. It describes all the hidden
orders in the markets including those in exchanges and dark pools.
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Figure 1: Dark Pool Market Share. The plot shows the annual data of dark pool volume as a percentage
of the total consolidated volume in the US, Europe, and Canada.
Data source: US data (2008 - 2015) is from “Rosenblatt Securities: Let There Be Light, January 2016
Issue” and Europe data (2010 - 2015) is from “Rosenblatt Securities: Let There Be Light – European Edition,
January 2016 Issue”. Figures in Canada (2007 - 2015) are derived from reports of IIROC.
optimize routing and execution according to different sets of considerations and trading
protocols. Another reason for the proliferation is the regulation changes that have been made
to encourage competition between trading venues. For example, in the U.S., Regulation NMS
(National Market System) was revised and reformed in 2005 to encourage the operation
of various platforms, and as a consequence, a wide variety of trading centers have been
established since then. Another example is the introduction of the Market in Financial
Instruments Directive (MiFID) in the European Union in 2007, which spurred the creation
of new trading venues, including dark pools.10
There are two key commonalities in dark pools’ operating protocols: the pricing mecha-
nism and execution mechanism. First, dark pools generally do not provide price discovery.
Instead, they typically use a price derived from an existing primary market as their trans-
action price. The most commonly used pricing mechanism is the mid-point mechanism: a
pricing method to cross orders at the concurrent mid-point of the National Best Bid and
10In recent years, however, as the debate about dark pool usage has escalated, many countries have started
to consider restrictions on dark trading. For example, Canada and Australia have required dark liquidity to
provide a “meaningful price improvement” of at least one trading increment (i.e., one cent in most major
markets), and US regulators have also been contemplating imposing such restrictions. In recent years, US
regulators start to strengthen law enforcement against dark pools and urged their upgrading in operation.
These cases include UBS Securities (Jan 2015), Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P (SIGMA X, July
2015), and Barclays (Jan 2015).
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Offer (NBBO).11 Second, unlike exchanges where orders are cleared at the exchange price,
in most of the dark pools, orders don’t clear. Instead, dark pools adopt a “rationing” mech-
anism to execute orders. That is, traders anonymously place unpriced orders to the pool,
and the orders are matched and executed probabilistically – orders in the shorter side are
executed for sure, whereas orders in the longer side are rationed probabilistically.
The pricing and execution mechanisms of dark pools’ operation reflect the trade-off of
trading in a dark pool for an individual trader. On the one hand, dark pools have lower
transaction costs than exchanges (typically because orders are executed within the NBBO,
with the “trade-at rule” further enhancing such price improvement), and lessen the price
impact for big orders. On the other hand, investors suffer a lower execution rate compared
with the exchange. Gresse (2006) found that the execution probability in the two dark
pools in his dataset was only 2-4 percent, while Ye (2010) documents a dark pool execution
probability of 4.11% (NYSE listed) and 2.17% (NASDAQ listed) in his dataset, in comparison
with a probability of 31.47% and 26.48% for their exchange counterparts.12.
The dark pools’ participating constituent base has evolved over time. In the early years,
dark pools were designed as venues where large, uninformed traders transact blocks of shares
to reduce price impact. This is possible because dark pools are not subject to NMS fair access
requirements and can thus prohibit or limit access to their services (see Reg ATS Rule
301(b)(5)). In recent years, however, this has changed greatly. According to an industry
insider in Rosenblatt Securities Inc., “it can be assumed that most pools are open to most
investors connecting to the pool, provided the investors do not violate any codes of conduct.”
A measure of such a change is reflected in the trading sizes of dark pools. Figure 2 shows
the average trading size in the U.S. According to the data, the US average trading size in
dark pools and exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) have been started to converge since 2011,
highlighting the fact that the participating constituents in these venues have become more
and more similar. It implies that the exclusivity of a dark pool to informed traders has been
weakened . As a result, more prominence has been attached to the issue of the potential
impact of dark pools on price discovery, because as more informed traders obtain access to
dark pools, their migration to dark pools may hurt the information aggregation process in
the exchange,13.
Dark pools are heterogeneous. The types of dark pools can be classified according to
different characteristics based on their ownership structure, pricing access, operation mech-
anism, constituency and other factors. All of these categories are in constant flux for the
11Nimalendran and Ray (2014) document the usage of such a pricing mechanism in their dark trading
sample and find that not all trades are at the midpoint of NBBO, but about 57% transactions are within
.01% of the price around the midpoint. In this paper, we follow the majority and adopt the mid-point pricing
mechanism.
12Nowadays, a rising concern of dark pools is their vulnerability to predatory trading by High Frequency
Traders (HFTs) (See Mittal (2008), Nimalendran and Ray (2014), ASIC (2013) for instance.)
13This paper, as well as Zhu (2014) considers full access for informed traders.
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Figure 2: Average Trade Size. The plot shows the annual average trade size of US dark pools, NYSE
and NASDAQ, from 2009 to 2015.
Data source: Rosenblatt Securities.
dark pools. Most of the pools also overlap in one or more categories as well, only the owner
types remain constant overtime. We provide a discussion on some characteristics and their
examples.
(i) Pricing. Dark pools use three primary pricing mechanisms. The execution will
take place once two sides of a suitable trade are matched. The three pricing mechanisms are
automatic pricing (usually at the midpoint of the best bid and offer), derived pricing (for
example, average price during the last five minutes), and negotiated pricing (for example,
Liquidnet Negotiatoin offers availability of one-to-one negotiation of price and size).
(ii) Order Type. There are primarily three types of order that prevails in dark pools:
limit orders (to buy or to sell a security at a desired price or better), peg orders (peg to
the NBBO, for example midpoint or alternate midpoint,14) and immediate or cancel order
(IOC). A dark pool may accept a subset of these order types. Pools that accept limit
orders may offer some price discovery (usually within the NBBO). These pools include,
for example, Credit Suisse’s CrossFinder, Goldman Sachs’ Sigma X, Citi’s Citi Cross, and
Morgan Stanley’s MS Pool. Pools that execute peg orders do not provide price discovery.
These include, for example, Instinet, Liquidnet, and ITG Posit. Pools accepting only IOC
orders are single dealer platforms (SDP), where the operator works as market makers and
14Traders are able to specify premiums or discounts vis-a`-vis the mid when placing a trade. For example,
a motivated buyer may specify an order that promises to pay the mid plus a penny. This would give this
trade priority over all other buy orders.
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customers interact solely with the operator’s own desk (for example, Citadel Connect and
Knight Link by KCG15).
(iii) Execution Frequency and Order Information. There are three modes of exe-
cution: scheduled crossing, continuous blind crossing, and indicated market.16 The scheduled
crossing networks include BIDS, ITG POSIT Match, and Instinet US Crossing. In sched-
uled crossing networks, the two sides of a trade cross during a set period. These networks
typically do not display quotes but may have an order imbalance indicator. Continuous
blind crossing networks continuously cross orders for which no quotes are given. Indicated
markets cross orders using participants’ indications of interest (IOIs) and provide some level
of transparency in order to attract liquidity. Liquidnet and Merrill Lynch offer variations on
this theme.17
(iv) Customer Base and Exclusivity. There are dark pools which design their rules
and monitor trading in an attempt to limit access to buy-side (natural contra-side) insti-
tutional investors. According to Boni et al. (2013), Liquidnet “Classic” is one of those. A
measure of the exclusivity is the average trading size of a dark pool. In May 2015, among
the 40 active dark pools operating in the US, there are 5 dark pools in which over 50% of
their Average Daily Volumes are block volume (larger than 10k per trade). Those pools can
be regarded as “Institutional dark pools,” and they include Liquidinet Negotiated, Barclays
Directx, Citi Liquifi, Liquidnet H20, Instinet VWAP Cross, and BIDS Trading. Other dark
pools have percentages of block volumes less than 15%, with most of them lower than 2%.18
(v) Ownership Structure. According to Rosenblatt (2015), dark pools can be classified
into four categories according to their ownership structure. This is the only classification
that does not fluctuate over time. The four categories include the Bulge Bracket/Investment
bank, Independent agency, Market maker, and Consortium-sponsored. In May 2015, The
market shares of the four categories are, respectively, 55.28%, 24.11%, 13.79%, and 6.82%.
Examples of the Bulge Bracket/Investment bank-owned dark pools are CS Crossfinder, UBS
ATS, DB SuperX, and MS Pool. Independent agency owned pools include, for example,
ITG POSIT, Instinet CBX, ConvergEx Millennium. Market maker owned pools include
Citadel Connect and Knight Link by KCG, and Consortium-sponsored pools include Level
and BIDS. 19
Finally, “dark pools liquidity” is not equivalent to “dark liquidity.” Dark liquidity, or
dark volume, is a broader concept since it measures the total non-displayed market volume.
Exchanges, for example, can contain “dark” volumes, which are applied through iceberg
15Getco LLC once operated an SDP called GetMatched. Following the 2013 merger of Knight Capital
Group and Getco LLC, GetMatched was decommissioned.
16See DeCovny (2008).
17Pipeline, a well-known dark pool using IOIs, settled allegations that it misled customers and was shut
in May 2012.
18“Let There Be Light , Jun 2015,” Rosenblatt Securities, Inc.
19“Let There Be Light , Jun 2015,” Rosenblatt Securities, Inc.
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orders and workup processes. According to the TABB group’ classification, dark volume can
break down into retail-wholesaler, dark pool volume, and hidden exchange volume. As of
Q2-2015, the percentages of each are 40.1%, 39.7%, and 20.2% respectively. In total, the
dark volume was 43.9% of the consolidated volume.20
3 The Model
The model considers an economy that lasts for three periods. We index the periods by 0,
1, and 2. There is one risky asset that is traded during the two periods with an uncertain
fundamental value
v˜ =
{
−σv, with probability 12 ,
σv, with probability
1
2
.
That is to say, the risky asset has an unconditional mean zero and standard deviation σv.
In period 0, v˜ is realized, but this information is not revealed to the public.
There are two types of traders who are potentially interested in the risky asset: informed
speculators and uninformed liquidity traders. We assume that they are all risk-neutral.
There is a continuum of informed speculators with measure µ, a continuum of uninformed
liquidity buyers with measure Z+, and a continuum of liquidity sellers with measure Z−. We
assume that Z+, Z− are identical and continuously distributed random variables on [0,+∞),
with mean 1
2
µz. Z
+, Z− are also realized at period 0 so that liquidity buyers and liquidity
sellers arrive at the market at the same time. The realizations of Z+, Z− are not observed
by any market participants.
In period 0, each informed speculator receives his or her own private signal regarding the
value of the asset, si = v˜ + ei, where i is the index of informed traders and ei represents the
noise of the signal.21 We assume that ei are identically independently distributed normal
random variables, with mean 0 and standard deviation σe. Therefore, in the first period,
they trade on both their private information and public information (if there is any). They
can trade (either buy or sell) up to 1 unit of the asset. If there are more than one venue
to trade, they can split their orders. Without loss of generality, we assume that informed
speculators only trade in period 1.22 The model is distinctive to Zhu (2014) in the information
20“US Equity Market Structure: Q2-2015 TABB Equity Digest,” TABB Group, Oct. 2015.
21According to Gyntelberg et al. (2010), there are various types of private information that stock market
investors may have about the fundamental determinants of a firm’s value, including knowledge of the firm’s
products and innovation prospect, management quality, and the strength and likely strategies of the firm’s
competitors. Private information may also include passively collected information about macro-variables and
other fundamentals which may be dispersed among customers. Equity market order flow to a large degree
reflects transactions by investors who are very active in collecting private information. A more detailed
discussion is in section 6.3.
22In period 2 when the informed traders’ private information becomes public, they lost their information
advantage. Since the informed agents are risk neutral and they only enter the market for profit, they will
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structure. Zhu (2014) assumes that all informed traders receive exact signals about the
asset, whereas we consider a noisy information structure.23 The introduction of a richer
information structure is crucial to our analysis, not only because it is more realistic, but
also because it reveals a sorting effect of market fragmentation on information. That is, in
equilibrium, traders with strong signals trade in the exchange, traders with modest signals
trade in the dark pool, and traders with weak signals do not trade. This sorting effect is
the major economic force in the trader’s venue-selection and the process of price discovery.
The absence of such an effect will likely cause instability of predictions in multiple equilibra,
such as discussed in Zhu (2014). A more detailed discussion is in Section 4.2.
A liquidity buyer (seller) comes to the market to buy (sell) 1 unit of the risky asset.
Similarly, one can split their orders if there exist multiple transaction venues. The unin-
formed liquidity traders, however, do not have any private information. They enter the
market to meet their liquidity demands. The level of their liquidity demand is measured
by a delay cost, a cost that reflect how urgent one needs his or her order to be fulfilled in
period 1. More precisely, if a liquidity trader, buyer or seller, cannot have his or her order
executed in period 1, a delay cost is incurred. The delay cost (per unit) is represented by
σvdj, where j is the index for the liquidity traders. djs are i.i.d random variables with a
Cumulative Distribution Function G(x) : [0, d¯] → [0, 1], where G(x) ∈ C2, 1 ≤ d¯ < ∞ and
G′(x) + xG′′(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ [0, 1]. 24 Again, djs are realized at period 0.
There are two venues for traders to trade: an exchange (the Lit market) and a dark pool.
We will then consider a benchmark model where there is only one trading venue for the
agents – the exchange only. By comparing our model with the benchmark model, we are
able to study the impact of a dark pool to the public exchange, and the interaction between
the two venues. We now specify the transaction rules in the two venues and the problems of
each type of traders.
Finally, the distributions of v˜, Z+, Z−, {ei}, {dj} are all publicly known information.
3.1 Transaction rules in the exchange (Lit market)
A lit market is an exchange for the asset. The exchange is modeled in the spirit of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). Precisely, in the lit market, there is a risk neutral market maker who
facilitate transactions. The objective of the market maker is to balance his or her budget.
The market maker has no private information. Therefore, at period 0, the market maker
announces a bid and an ask price for the risky asset, based only on public information. The
announced bid and ask price will be the prices for any order submitted to the exchange in
period 1, and will be committed by the market maker. Because of symmetry of v˜ and the
not actively place orders in the second period.
23We do not consider information acquisition cost because it is modeled as a sunk cost in this paper.
24This additional assumption is for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. It is satisfied by many commonly
used distributions. For example, a uniform distribution.
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fact that the unconditional mean of v˜ is zero, the midpoint of the market maker’s bid and
ask is zero. Therefore, the ask price in the lit market is some A > 0, and bid price in the
lit market is −A. That is, the half-spread is represented by A. We normalize A by the
standard deviation of v˜, A
σv
, and get the normalized half-spread. For simplicity, we refer to
A as the “spread,” and A
σv
as the “normalized spread.” The spread represents a transaction
cost in the lit market, because all traders, buyers or sellers, lose A dollars (per unit) to the
market maker whenever they trade on the exchange. Thus, alternatively, we also refer to A
as the (per unit) “exchange transaction cost” and A
σv
as the (per unit) “normalized exchange
transaction cost.”
In period 1, since informed speculators hold some information advantage about the asset,
the market maker may lose money to the informed traders ex post. For example, if the
realized value of the asset is σv, then the market maker loses money if he is trading against
a “Buy” order. Precisely, let γe, γe be the respective fraction of informed speculators who
place “Buy” and who place “Sell” orders on exchange, and let αe be fraction of uninformed
liquidity traders who trade in the exchange. For now we assume that they do not split orders
among venues, then WLOG if the realized value of v˜ is σv, the ex post payoff of the market
maker is
MM payoff = σv[(γeµ− γeµ) + (αeZ− − αeZ+)] + A[γeµ+ γeµ+ αeZ+ + αeZ−],
where the first term is the market maker’s profit on the asset. It is composed of the net
gain from the informed traders, γeµ − γeµ, and the net gain from the uninformed traders,
αeZ
− − αeZ+. The second term is the gains obtained from the transaction fee (spread) per
every exchange order. If the realized value of the asset is −σv, by symmetry, the market
maker’s payoff shall be the same as above. In this way, we also refer to γe as the fraction of
informed who “make money” (trade in the “right direction”), and γe the fraction of informed
who “lose money” (trade in the “wrong direction”).
A market maker’s objective is to break even on average.25 That is,
0 = E
{
σv[(γeµ− γeµ) + (αeZ− − αeZ+)] + A[γeµ+ γeµ+ αeZ+ + αeZ−]
}
.
Since EZ+ = EZ− = 1
2
µz, the market maker’s objective becomes
0 = σv(−γe + γe)µ+ A[(γe + γe)µ+ αeµz].
It implies that,
A =
γe − γe
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
σv. (1)
25One can think of this as as result of the competition among market makers. For simplicity, we assume
that there is one market maker operating.
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If γe ≥ γe(≥ 0)andαe ≥ 0, then the normalized spread 0 ≤ Aσv ≤ 1. In the next sections,
we will show that in equilibrium, γe > γe. In other words, informed traders are more
likely to “make money” (trade in the “right direction”). Intuitively this is true because of
their information advantage. Therefore, on average, the market maker loses money to the
informed.
At the end of period 1, the market maker observe the exchange volumes Vb, Vs for “Buy”
volume and “Sell” volume respectively. Based on such information, the market maker then
announces a closing price P1 = E[v˜|Vb, Vs], which we consider as a proxy for the fundamental
value of the asset v˜. This is because E[v˜|P1, Vb, Vs] = E[E[v˜|P1, Vb, Vs]|P1] = P1. We are in-
terested in how much the price P1 can aggregate information in the market (price discovery),
that is, how close P1 is to the true value of the asset.
In period 2, since the realization of v˜ has already been revealed, all trades will be made
at the price that is equal to that realization. Thus, the payoff of the market maker in period
2 is automatically zero.
The reason we model the exchange as a market maker instead of other trading protocols
such as limit order books is for the same reason as Zhu (2014). It is a simple but tractable
way to capture the basic trade-off of dark pools. These trade-offs include lower transaction
costs (lower spread) and higher execution risks, which is common to most trading protocols.
3.2 Transaction rules in the dark pool
We consider the operational costs of the dark pool as a sunk cost, and hence not considered
in the model. Also, we normalize the entry fee of a dark pool as zero. The trading protocols
in the dark pool we consider, include the pricing mechanism, which refers to on what price
the dark pool execute orders, and the execution mechanism, which refers to how to match
the buying and selling orders.26
We restrict our attention to dark pools of a particular pricing mechanism: the midpoint
pricing. That is, the orders in the dark pool are crossed at the midpoint of the bid-ask in the
exchange. Since the midpoint of the exchange price is 0, the transaction price in the dark
pool is 0. The midpoint pricing mechanism is a reflection of an advantage trading in the
dark pool: price improvement. As we point out previously, a trader has to pay a transaction
cost (the spread) A on the exchange, no matter at which direction he or she is trading. But
in the dark pool, such cost is reduced to 0.
The execution mechanism we consider in this paper is a rationing mechanism. That is,
orders in the shorter side are executed with probability one, whereas orders in the longer side
are executed probabilistically to balance the market. For example, suppose the realization
of v˜ is σv (the case when v˜ = −σv is symmetric). Let γd, γd be the fractions of informed
26As in section 2, we point out that not all dark pools are equal. There might be other features that
investors concern. But for simplicity we focus on the two major aspects of a dark pool.
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speculators who trade in the “right direction” and “wrong direction” respectively, αd be
the fraction of uninformed liquidity traders who trade in the dark pool in period 1, then the
respective expected execution rates (taken with respect to Z−, Z+) for trading in the “wrong
direction” and in the “right direction” are: ,
R¯ = E
[
min
{
1,
γdµ+ αdZ
+
γdµ+ αdZ−
}]
, (2)
R = E
[
min
{
1,
γdµ+ αdZ
−
γdµ+ αdZ+
}]
. (3)
Therefore, R, R¯ ∈ [0, 1]. The execution mechanism in the dark pool reflects a disadvantage
of trading in the dark pool: execution risk. On average, one cannot expect that his or her
orders be executed with probability 1 in a dark pool. In contrast, the market maker in the
exchange is able to provide such certainty.
Moreover, as we will show in the next section, γd > γd. This means that the information
asymmetry exists in the dark pool and informed traders are more likely to trade in the “right
direction.” Therefore, R ≤ R¯. That is to say, orders that are in the “right direction” are less
likely to be executed than orders that are in the “wrong direction.” In this way, we obtain
a measure of dark pool adverse selection cost in the dark pool by
(R¯−R)σv
We therefore refer to R¯−R as the “Normalized dark pool adverse selection cost.”
Without loss of generality, we assume that the dark pool operates only in period 1. In
period 2, since the realization of v˜ is revealed, orders in the exchange are executed at that
realized value. The dark pool loses its advantage and becomes redundant as nobody is willing
to trade there. Therefore, unless cancelled, orders that failed to execute in period 1 will be
routed to the exchange and executed there in period 2.
3.3 The informed speculators’ problem
As we point out, the informed traders only participate in period 1, when they can use
their private information to their advantage. Upon the reception of a signal, the informed
speculators update their beliefs about the asset fundamental value using Bayes’ rule. Let
B(s) be the probability that the realization is high (σv), conditional on signal s, then by
Bayes’ rule,
B(s) = Pr(v˜ = σv|s) =
φ( s−σv
σe
)
φ( s−σv
σe
) + φ( s+σv
σe
)
, (4)
where φ(x) is the pdf of a standard normal distribution function. B(s) ∈ (0, 1) and B(s) is
strictly increasing in s.
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Consider an informed trader with signal s, given the exchange spread, A, and the dark
pool execution probabilities, R¯, R, the expected (per unit) “Buy” and “Sell” profit in each
venue, or do not trade, are respectively,
Exchange(Lit): “Buy”: B(s)σv − (1−B(s))σv − A,
“Sell”: − [B(s)σv − (1−B(s))σv]− A.
Dark pool: “Buy”: B(s)Rσv − (1−B(s))R¯σv,
“Sell”: − [B(s)Rσv − (1−B(s))R¯σv].
Not trade: 0.
An informed speculator’s problem is then, given his or her signal s, to choose a trading
direction in {“Buy”, “Sell”}, the quantity in each venue {Exchange(Lit), Dark pool, Do not
trade} to maximize his or her total expected payoff, such that total quantity does not exceed
1 unit.27
We argue that, in equilibrium, whenever he or she decides to trade, an informed trader
will place a “Buy” order if his or her signal is positive, and a “Sell” order if his or her signal
is negative. Moreover, almost surely it is optimal for him to send the entire order to one of
the two venues, or not trade at all. The argument is summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. (Trading direction and non-split orders, informed)28 If an informed trader
decide to trade, it is strictly optimal to “Buy” if his or her signal s > 0 and to “Sell” if s < 0.
Moreover, with probability one, an informed trader strictly prefers to send the entire order
to one of the two venues, or do not trade at all.
The trading direction is rather straightforward since a positive signal indicates that the
asset’s fundamental value is more likely to be high (i.e., σv), and hence more profitable in
a “Buy” direction, whereas a negative signals indicates a low value (i.e., −σv) and hence
more profitable in a “Sell” direction. And, since each trader’s signal is drawn from the
same continuous distribution, and there is a continuum of informed traders, by law of large
numbers, the realization of signals among them are continuously distributed. Therefore, the
beliefs are distributed continuously. Since no individual has impact on the market, and the
expected profit in each venue is linear in the agents’ beliefs, it is with probability 1 that, for
any informed trader with signal s, one venue (or not trade) is strictly better than others.
By Lemma 1, the potential trading direction is determined once an agent receives his
or her signal. Moreover, the magnitude of B(|s|) reflects the probability that this trading
27The case that the informed speculator simultaneously place “Buy” and “Sell” orders in each venue is
not considered, because the agents have no individual impact to the market. By the linearity of the per unit
profit in each venue, it is never optimal to do so.
28A non-slit order is strictly preferred in this model. This is a stronger result than Zhu (2014), in which it
is only weakly optimal to not split orders for the informed because they are all indifferent between the two
venues.
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direction is “right.” Thus |s| can be regarded as the strength of one’s signal, and B(|s|),
can be regarded as the agent’s confidence level in their information. A strong signal (i.e., a
high |s|) represents a strong belief that the trading direction is “right,” whereas weak signals
(i.e., low |s|) represents a weak belief in the trading direction. We will show in the next
section, how much credit an informed trader gives to his or her private information is crucial
in determining his or her strategies of venue selection.
Based on an informed traders’ signal strength, B(|s|), the payoffs of trading in each venue
and no trade are, respectively,
Exchange(Lit) : B(|s|)σv − (1−B(|s|))σv − A, (5)
Dark pool : B(|s|)Rσv − (1−B(|s|))R¯σv, (6)
Not trade : 0. (7)
An informed agent’s problem is then reduced to choosing one of the two venues and
sending the entire 1 unit to it, with a trading direction specified in Lemma 1, or not trade
at all, to yield the maximum payoff, based on his or her confidence level B(|s|).
Finally, we define the strategy of an informed speculator who receives a signal s by a
mapping
hI(s) : (∞,∞)→ {“Buy”, “Sell”} × {Exchange(Lit), Dark pool, Not trade}.
3.4 The uninformed liquidity traders’ problem
Liquidity buyer or seller types are specified by the level of their liquidity demand – the (per
unit) delay cost d. If the agent fails to have his or her order executed in period 1, he or she
will bear a (per unit) cost of σvd. Therefore a higher delay cost implies a higher demand for
liquidity, and a higher devaluation on execution risk for the traders.
More precisely, a type d uninformed liquidity buyer’s (seller’s) per unit payoffs of trading
in the exchange, in the dark pool, or delaying trade are, respectively,
Exchange(Lit) : −A, (8)
Dark pool : −(R¯−R)
2
σv − (1− R¯ +R)
2
)σvd, (9)
Delay trade : −σvd. (10)
Similarly, we argue that in period 1, it is strictly optimal for any liquidity trader to send
the entire order to one of the two venues, or delay the trade, almost surly. The argument is
summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. (No split orders, uninformed)A liquidity trader (buyer or seller) strictly
prefers to send the entire order to one of the venues, or delay trade.
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The intuition of Lemma 2 is similar. Since all individuals are infinitesimal, no single
trader has an impact on the market. For any liquidity trader, he or she either strictly prefers
one venue over the other or is indifferent between two venues (or do not trade). Since the
distribution of the delay cost d is continuous, it is with probability one that one venue (or
delay) is strictly better than the other.
By Lemma 2, a type d liquidity buyer’s (or seller’s) problem is to maximize his or her
payoff (i.e., minimize the costs), by choosing one of the venues in which trade the entire
order in period 1, or to delay trade to period 2.
Moreover, we define the strategy of a type d uninformed liquidity trader by a mapping:
hU,ι(d) : [0, d¯]→ {Exchange(Lit), Dark pool, Delay trade},
where ι ∈ {Buyer, Seller}
Finally, the trading timeline of the model is summarized in Figure 3. At period 0, the
asset fundamental value v˜, the measure of liquidity buyers Z+ and liquidity sellers Z−, the
signal for each informed trader si, the per unit delay cost for each uninformed trader dj
are realized. But none of this information is public. Also, at period 0, the market maker
announces the bid-ask prices with the spread A. After that, traders select venues in which
place orders, which are executed according to the transaction rules in each venue. At the
end of period 1, before the revelation or the value of the asset, the market maker announces
a closing price of period 1, based on the volumes he observes in the exchange during that
period. Then after the revelation of v˜, orders that failed to execute in period 1 are routed to
the exchange (unless cancelled) and execute at the revealed value of v˜. The market is then
closed.
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4 The Equilibrium
The model we describe in Section 3 assumes that both the exchange (Lit), and the dark pool
are available to traders. We refer to it as the “Multi-venue” Model. We now introduce a
benchmark in which there is only one venue that is operating: the exchange (Lit market).
We refer to it as the “Single-venue” Model. The comparison between the two model in
Section 5 gives us insights into the impacts of dark pools to market behaviors.
4.1 Benchmark model: without a dark pool
In the benchmark model, all else are the same except that the exchange (the lit market) is
the only trading venue available for traders. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 also hold in this model,
i.e., traders do not split their orders. We use the superscription “S” to denote the “single
venue” model. The equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. (Benchmark: without a dark pool) An equilibrium of the “Single-venue”
model is a strategy for the informed speculators, hSI(s), a strategy for the uninformed liquidity
traders, hSU,ι(d), ι ∈ {Buyer, Seller}, an exchange spread AS, a set of participation fractions
γe
S, γe
S, αSe , such that
(i) given AS, hSI(s) and h
S
U,ι(d) are optimal, respectively, for an informed speculator with
signal s and for an uninformed liquidity trader with per unit delay cost d;
(ii) given γe
S, γe
S, and αSe , the exchange spread A
S makes a market maker in the exchange
break-even on average;
(iii) γe
S, γe
S measure the respective fractions of informed traders who trade in the “right”
and “wrong” direction in the exchange, and αSe measures the period 1 exchange fraction of
uninformed traders.
Given γe
S, γe
S, and αSe , an exchange spread A
S that makes the market maker break even
on average satisfies (1). That is,
AS =
γe
S − γeS
γe
S + γeS + αSe
µz
µ
σv. (11)
Equation (11) implies that if γe
S ≥ γeS ≥ 0, and αSe > 0, then σv ≥ AS ≥ 0. Considering
an informed trader with signal “s,” by Lemma 1, the optimal trading direction is to “Buy” if
s ≥ 0 and to “Sell” if s < 0. Then given AS, The expected payoffs of trading in the exchange
and do not trade are, respectively:
Exchange(Lit) : B(|s|)σv − (1−B(|s|))σv − AS,
Not trade : 0.
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Figure 4: Payoffs For Traders, Single-venue
Suppose σv ≥ AS ≥ 0, then if the signal is extremely weak, i.e., B(|s|) = 12 , or, s = 0,
the expected payoff of trading in the exchange is strictly negative, and it is strictly optimal
not to trade. In contrast, if the signal is extremely strong, i.e., B(s) = 1, or, s = ±∞, the
expected payoff of trading in the exchange is strictly positive, and it is strictly optimal to
trade in the exchange. This is illustrated in Figure 4a. Therefore there must exist some
cut-off point ŝ > 0 such that the ŝ type informed traders are indifferent between trading in
the exchange and do not trade. That is,
B(ŝ)σv − (1−B(ŝ))σv − AS = 0, (12)
and the optimal choice for an informed trader with signal s is then
hSI(s) =

(“Buy”, Exchange(Lit)) if s ≥ ŝ,
(“Sell”, Exchange(Lit)) if s < −ŝ,
Do not trade others.
(13)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the realization of v˜ is σv. If all informed specu-
lators follow the same optimal strategy, then the fraction of informed traders who will trade
in the “right” and “wrong” directions across the population are, respectively,
γe
S = Pr(s ≥ ŝ|v˜ = σv) = Pr(s ≤ −ŝ|v˜ = −σv) = 1− Φ( ŝ− σv
σe
), (14)
γe
S = Pr(s < −ŝ|v˜ = σv) = Pr(s > ŝ|v˜ = −σv) = 1− Φ( ŝ+ σv
σe
). (15)
(14),(15) imply that γe
S ≥ γeS > 0.
Now, we consider an uninformed liquidity trader with a (per unit) delay cost “d.” Simi-
larly, his or he payoffs of trading in the exchange and delaying trade are, respectively:
Exchange(Lit) : −AS,
Delay trade : −σvd.
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Since d ∈ [0, d¯] with d¯ ≥ 1, and σv ≥ AS ≥ 0, if the liquidity trader is extremely patient, i.e.,
d = 0, it is strictly optimal to delay trade to period 2. In contrast, if the liquidity trader is
extremely impatient, i.e., d = d¯ > 1, it is strictly optimal to trade in the exchange. This is
shown in Figure 4b. Therefore, there also exists a cut-off d̂ such that the type “d̂ ” liquidity
trader is indifferent between trading in the exchange and delaying trade to the next period.
That is,
−AS = −σvd̂. (16)
To combine (12) with (16), we derive that
d̂ = 2B(ŝ)− 1.
The optimal strategy for uninformed liquidity traders is then,
hSU,ι(d) =
{
(“Buy” if ι=Buyer, or “Sell” if ι=Seller, Exchange(Lit)) if d ≥ 2B(ŝ)− 1,
Delay trade others.
(17)
The period 1 exchange participation rate for the uninformed traders is then
αSe = Pr(d ≥ d̂) = 1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1), (18)
and 0 ≤ αSe ≤ 1.
We then find a cut-off equilibrium. Theorem 1 summarizes the existence and uniqueness.
Theorem 1. (Existence and Uniquness, benchmark) For any σe, σv ≥ 0, there exists
an equilibrium in which traders follow cut-off strategies. That is, the respective optimal
strategies for informed speculators and uninformed liquidity traders, hSI(s) and h
S
U,ι(d), are
defined as (13) and (17), with the cut-off ŝ determined by (12). The exchange spread AS
satisfies (11), and the participation fractions γe
S, γe
S, αSe are determined respectively by (14),
(15), (18), (11).
Moreover, every equilibrium is a cut-off equilibrium, and the equilibrium is unique if
σe, σv > 0, G
′(x) + xG′′(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ [0, 1].
The benchmark clearly gives us some insight regarding the sorting effect on types of
traders. In equilibrium, it is strictly optimal for informed traders with relatively strong
signals to trade in the exchange and for those with weak signals not to trade (avoid trading).
Similarly, it is strictly optimal for uninformed liquidity traders who are relatively patient
to trade in the exchange and for those who are relatively impatient to delay trade. The
exchange provides functions to separate certain types of traders from others. As we will
point out later, such a sorting effect is even strengthened in the presence of a dark pool.
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4.2 Multi-venue model: with a dark pool
Two trading venues are available in the multi-venue model: an exchange (Lit) and a dark
pool. To differentiate from the single-venue model, we do not use the superscription S in the
multi-venue model. The equilibrium of the multi-venue is defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Multi-venue, with a dark pool) An equilibrium is a strategy for the
informed speculators, hI(s), a strategy for and for the uninformed liquidity traders, hU,ι(d),
an exchange spread, A, two expected execution rate in the dark pool R¯, R , and a set of
participation fractions γe, γe, γd, γd, αe, αd, s.t.
(i) hI(s) is optimal for informed speculators with signal s, whereas hU,ι(d) is optimal for
uninformed liquidity traders with (per unit) delay cost d, given A, R¯, and R.
(ii) the exchange spread A makes a market maker in the exchange break-even on average,
given γe, γe, γd, γd, αe, and αd;
(iii) the dark pool operates using a mid-pricing and a rationing execution mechanism. R
and R¯ are the respective expected execution probability for orders that are in the “right”
and in the “wrong” directions;
(iv) γe and γe measure the respective fractions of informed traders in the exchange who
trade in the “right” and “wrong” directions. γd and γd measure the respective fractions of
informed traders in the dark pool who trade in the “right” and “wrong” directions. αe and
αd measure the respective fraction of uninformed traders who trade in the exchange and in
the dark pool in period 1.
Consider an informed speculator with signal “s.” Based on the strength of his or her
signal B(|s|), the payoffs of trading in the exchange, the dark pool and do not trade are
summarized in (5), (6), (7). These payoffs are shown in Figure 5a.
Suppose 1 ≥ R¯ ≥ R > 0 and σv ≥ A ≥ 0. As is shown in Figure 5a, if a trader receives
extremely weak signals (s = 0 for example), it is never profitable to trade, since trading is
costly. However, whenever an informed trader decides to trade, he faces a trade-off between
execution certainty in the exchange and price improvement in the dark pool. When |s| is low,
the need for price improvement overwhelms the need for execution, in which case, trading in
a dark pool is better. But as the signals becomes stronger, the need for execution grows faster
than the need for price improvement. This can be observed from the fact that the exchange
payoff has a higher slope with respect to B(|s|) than the dark pool payoff. Therefore, when
s is extremely high, it is possible that the two intersect. Suppose an informed trader with
signal s0 > 0 is indifferent between trading in a dark pool and not trade, an informed with
signal s1 > 0 is indifferent between trading in a dark pool and in the exchange, then by (5),
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Figure 5: Payoffs For Traders, Multi-venue
(6), and (7), s0, s1 satisfies:
B(s0)(R¯ +R) = R¯ (19)
B(s1)
[
(1− R¯) + (1−R)]σv = A+ (1− R¯)σv. (20)
At this point, the existence and relationship of s0 and s1 is not established yet. For now,
we suppose that (s0, s1) exists and s0 < s1 < +∞ (we will prove that this is true in every
equilibrium), the optimal strategy for an informed trader with signal s is then
hSI(s) =

(“Buy”, Exchange(Lit)) if s ≥ s1,
(“Buy”, Dark pool) if s0 ≤ s < s1,
(“Sell”, Dark pool) if − s1 ≤ s < −s0,
(“Sell”, Exchange(Lit)) if s < −s1,
Do not trade others.
(21)
This is illustrated in Figure 6. That is, it is strictly optimal that informed traders with
strong signals to trade in the exchange, informed traders with modest signals to trade in the
dark pool, and informed traders with weak signals to not trade.
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Figure 6: Strategy of Informed Traders
If all informed traders follow such strategy, the exchange fraction of informed who trade
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in the “right” and “wrong” directions are, respectively,
γe = Pr(s ≥ s1|v˜ = σv) = Pr(s ≤ −s1|v˜ = −σv) = 1− Φ(s1 − σv
σe
), (22)
γe = Pr(s < −s1|v˜ = σv) = Pr(s > s1|v˜ = −σv) = 1− Φ(s1 + σv
σe
). (23)
And the dark pool fraction of informed who trade in the “right” and “wrong” directions
are, respectively,
γd = Pr(s0 ≤ s < s1|v˜ = σv) = Pr(−s1 ≤ s < −s0|v˜ = −σv) = Φ(s1 − σv
σe
)− Φ(s0 − σv
σe
),
(24)
γd = Pr(−s1 ≤ s < −s0|v˜ = σv) = Pr(s0 ≤ s < s1|v˜ = −σv) = Φ(s1 + σv
σe
)− Φ(s0 + σv
σe
).
(25)
Similarly, for the uninformed, the payoffs of trading in the exchange, in the dark pool,
and delaying trade are respectively given in (8), (9), and (10), as illustrated in Figure 5b.
Again, a liquidity trader with extremely low liquidity demands would find it optimal to
delay trade. However, if he decides to trade in period 1, only those with extremely high
liquidity demands (i.e., extremely impatient) are willing to trade, for the similar reason as
the informed traders. Let d0 and d1 respectively represent the type of liquidity traders who
are indifferent between delaying trade and trading in a dark pool, and the type who are
indifferent between delaying trading in a dark pool and in the exchange, then by (8), (9),
and (10) we have
−(R¯−R)
2
σv − (1− R¯ +R)
2
)σvd0 = −σvd0,
−(R¯−R)
2
σv − (1− R¯ +R)
2
)σvd1 = −A.
Combine this with (19) and (20), we derive that
d0 = 2B(s0)− 1,
d1 = 2B(s1)− 1.
By a similar argument, the optimal strategy for an uninformed trader is also a cut-off
strategy:
hSU,ι(d) =

(“Buy” if ι=Buyer, or “Sell” if ι=Seller, Exchange(Lit)) if d ≥ 2B(s1)− 1,
(“Buy” if ι=Buyer, or “Sell” if ι=Seller, Dark pool) if 2B(s0)− 1
≤ d < 2B(s1)− 1,
Delay trade otherwise.
(26)
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This is described in Figure 7. The exchange fraction, αe, and dark pool fraction, αd, of
uninformed liquidity traders, are, respectively,
αe = 1−G(2B(s1)− 1), (27)
αd = G(2B(s1)− 1)−G(2B(s0)− 1). (28)
The fact that the traders the cut-off of uninformed traders’ are functions of the cut-off
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 −s0 
 
−s1 
  
s0 
  
s1 
  
Not trade 
“Buy” 
Dark pool 
“Buy” 
Exchange (Lit) 
“Sell” 
Exchange (Lit) 
“Sell” 
Dark pool 
0 d0 
 
d1 
  
d  
  
Dark pool Exchange (Lit) Delay 
Figure 7: Strategy of Uninformed Traders
of informed traders’ reveals that, in equilibrium, uninformed and informed traders always
move together. It cannot happen that uninformed traders move collectively from one venue
to another, forming a new equilibrium without influencing the behavior of the informed
traders. This is in contrast with Zhu (2014).
Given γe, γe, αe, the exchange spread A captured in (1) makes the market maker break
even. Also, given γd, γd, αd, and given the distribution of Z
+ and Z−, the expected execution
rates in the dark pool, R¯ and R, are respectively determined by (2) and (3).
If such s0, s1 exists, we find a cut-off equilibrium. But the existence is not obvious.
The difficulty arises from two aspects. First, we cannot simply apply a fixed point theorem
because it cannot distinguish the trivial equilibrium from others: a trivial equilibrium is one
in which all trades happen in one venue, for example, the exchange. Second, the equilibrium
involves a very complicated equation system and these equations are non-linear and are
not likely to exhibit monotonicity. Nevertheless, we are able to show in Theorem 2 that
the equilibrium exists. Moreover, all equilibria are cut-off equilibra, and all equilibra are
non-trivial.
Theorem 2. (Equilibrium with DP) For any σv, σe > 0, an equilibrium exists in which
traders follow cut-off strategies. That is, the respective optimal strategies for informed and
uninformed traders, hI(s) and h
U
ι (d), are defined as in (21) and (26), with cut-offs (s0, s1)
solving (19) and (20), 0 < s0 < s1. Moreover, every equilibrium is a cut-off equilibrium,
and every equilibrium is non trivial (meaning positive participation for both informed and
uninformed traders in both venues).
The exchange spread, A, the expected execution rates, R¯, R, are determined, respectively,
by (1), (2), and (3). The set of participation fractions, {γe, γe, γd, γd, αe, αd} are determined
by (22), (23), (24), (25), (27), and (28).
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Corollary 1. (Liquidity begets liquidity) αd > 0 if and only if γd − γd > 0.
The equilibrium characterized in Theorem 2 is distinctive to Zhu (2014) in the following
aspects. First, in contrast with Zhu (2014), in equilibrium in our model, there is a sorting
effect of market fragmentation, and both uninformed and informed traders always move
together. It is respectively optimal for informed traders with strong signals, modest signals,
and weak signals to trade in the exchange, in the dark pool, and do not trade, whereas
it is respectively optimal for uninformed traders with high, modest, and low degrees of
impatience to trade in the exchange, in the dark pool, and delay trade. In Zhu (2014),
however, such a sorting effect is absent for informed traders. In his model, informed traders
are homogeneous and indifferently between venues. This may cause the instability of its
prediction. For example, uninformed traders can collectively move from the dark pool to
the exchange. This movement may increase the adverse selection cost in the dark pool so
much so that they will stay in the exchange, and price discovery is strictly decreased. These
equilibra are not discussed in Zhu (2014). Our prediction is more robust in the sense that
traders always move together and this sorting effect exists in every equilibrium. The same
predictions on price discovery hold in every equilibrium.
Second, unlike Zhu (2014), in which there exists some cases where informed traders do not
participate in the dark pool, we predict that all equilibrium is non-trivial. That is, informed
and uninformed participate in both venues in all equilibra, as captured in Corollary 1. This
casts light on the dynamics of liquidity creation in a dark pool: informed and uninformed
traders tend to arrive the dark pool in a clustered fashion, which in turn attract more
liquidity to the dark pool, as documented in the literature.29 One explanation why Zhu
(2014) predicts a different result is that he assumes exact signals for traders. As we have
pointed out, traders with strong signals tend to prefer an exchange. It is possible that, in
some cases, they all crowd in the exchange and are absent in the dark pool. But again,
this might be subject to an unstable status. In our model, this will not happen because
with a noisy information structure, the dark pool will always be attractive to some informed
traders. This is related to the following aspect.
The equilibrium described in Theorem 2 also disclose one important function of dark
pools: a function that cannot be captured without a noisy information structure. That
is, dark pools help to mitigate traders’ information risk, i.e., the loss atributable to bad
information. Dark pools take a role as a “buffer zone” for informed traders – a gambling
place for those who are less well-informed to trade. This adds value to the trade-off of dark
pools, and shall clearly not be neglected. When information becomes noisier, more informed
traders will find dark pools more valuable places to trade. Also, if traders become risk-averse,
the importance of this function for dark pools will increase to a great extent.
Corollary 2. Given any σe, σv > 0, s1 > ŝ, and in correspondent, d1 > d̂.
29Sarkar et al. (2009) provide a more detailed description of such process.
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Corollary 3. (Adverse selection) ∀σe, σv > 0, 0 < γe < γe, 0 < γd < γd, and R¯−R > 0.
Proof. If σ ∈ (0,+∞), by Theorem 2, 0 < s0 < s1. Therefore by definition of (4), and (1),
(2), (3), (22), (23), (24), (25), (28), it must be that A
σv
, αd, αe ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < γe < γe <
1, 0 < γd < γd < 1. Therefore 0 < R < R¯ < 1.
Corollary 2 states that dark pools strictly decrease traders’ participation in the exchange.
Corollary 3 states that there exists adverse selection in both the exchange and the dark pool.
Market makers lose money to informed traders on average.
5 Dark Pool Trading and Information Structure
In this section, we restrict our attention to the following questions. These questions will be
discussed in Section 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively.
(i) How do each venue’s market participation and information asymmetry level vary with
the information structure, i.e., “σe”?
(ii) How does adding a dark pool impact market participation and information asymmetry?
(iii) How does adding a dark pool impact price discovery, and what are the determinants?
5.1 Information Precision and Market Characteristics
To recall, dark pools are of important value for informed traders who are less well-informed
because they mitigate their informational risks. When information becomes more precise,
such need decreases, and a migration of traders from one venue to another shall be observed.
In this section, we study how the traders’ participation and information asymmetry level in
each venue vary with the informational structure. The results are shown in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2. The numerical example is in Figure 9. We use σe to capture the information
precision for informed traders. A lower σe corresponds with lower noises, hence a higher
precision in their signals.
Proposition 1. (Exchange spread, Dark pool adverse selection costs) If σe is large,
then both the exchange spreads and the dark pool adverse selection costs increase in infor-
mation precision. That is, as σe decreases,
(Without DP): A
S
σv
strictly increases;
(With DP): Similarly, A
σv
increases, ̂¯R− R̂ increases,
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Proposition 2. (Participation rates) Suppose σe is large. Then for informed traders,
as information precision increases, both the exchange and the dark pool participation in-
crease. In contrast, for uninformed traders, as information precision increases, the exchange
participation decreases while the dark pool participation increase. And total uninformed
participation decreases. That is, as σe decreases,
(Without DP): γe
S − γeS strictly increases, and αSe strictly decreases;
(With DP): Similarly, γe − γe, γd − γd increases, αe decreases, αd increases, and αe + αd
decreases.30
Remark 1. when σe is large, as in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 , dark pool participation
for informed traders and dark pool adverse selection cost INCREASES with information
precision. When σe is small, however, they may DECREASE with information precision.
We have not been able to obtain comparative statics when σe is small, but we show this
inverted U-shape in the numerical example in Figure 9.31 While we provide an explanation
in the context, the explicit proof is of future work.
In the exchange, when signals become more precise, both the informed exchange par-
ticipation, γe − γe, and exchange spread, A, increase, whereas the uninformed exchange
participation, αe, decreases. The intuition is as follows. In equilibrium the informed traders
are sorted by the strengths of their signals. when there is an increment in their informa-
tion precision, the overall strengths of their signals are increased. Therefore, some informed
traders migrate from “do not trade” to “trade in the dark pool” and from “trade in the dark
pool” to “trade in the exchange.” This will cause a strict increase of information asymmetry
level in the exchange, and hence an increase of the exchange spread. Consequently, some
liquidity traders migrate from “trade in the exchange” to “trade in the dark pool,” which
decreases the uninformed participation in the exchange.
In the dark pool, the dark pool informed participation, γd−γd, and the dark pool adverse
selection, ̂¯R − R̂, exhibit an inverted U-shape with information precision. The intuition
for the inverted U-shape is as follows. A change in the information precision changes the
distribution of the signals’ strengths. When the information precision level is low (i.e., σe
is high), as the precision grows, signals become more concentrated in the relative “modest”
group, and more informed traders migrate from “do not trade” to the dark pool. Overall,
this induces a greater proportion of informed participation in the dark pool, and the dark
pool adverse selection increases. In contrast, when the information precision level is high
30γe − γe and γd − γd capture the “meaningful” participation of informed trades, in the sense that they
are the fractions of informed trades that trade in the “right” direction net the fractions that trade in the
“wrong” direction.
31In all our plots, we use a set of parameters in which µz = 60, µ = 30, Z
+, Z− has Gamma distributions
with mean 30 and variance 30 and G(d) = d3 for d¯ ∈ [0, 3].
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Figure 8: Transaction Costs. The left-hand figure shows the normalized spreads on the exchange and
how they vary with log(σe); the right-hand figure shows the adverse selection cost in the dark pool and how
it vary with log(σe). In both figures, log(σv) = 0.
(i.e., σe is low), as precision grows, signals become more concentrated in the relative “strong”
group. Thus, more informed traders migrate from the dark pool to the exchange, leaving a
lower proportion of informed trades in the dark pool, and the dark pool adverse selection
decreases.
An interesting comparison with Zhu (2014) is that, although Zhu (2014) does not consider
the information structure, he discusses the comparative statics of market behaviors as a
function of σv. σv and σe are comparable in the sense that, all else equal, informed traders’
information advantage increases in both information precision (i.e., as σe decreases), and the
asset value uncertainty (i.e., as σv increases, see a more detailed discussion in Section 5.3).
We highlight two major differences between our predictions and those of Zhu (2014).
First, our model predicts that traders’ participation exhibits a smooth variation cross-
sectionally (i.e., when σv grows), whereas there is a discontinuity in that of Zhu (2014).
In Zhu (2014), in equilibrium informed traders don’t trade in dark pools for some assets
unless the asset’s value uncertainty is high (i.e., σv is high). In contrast, we predict that
both informed and liquidity traders trade in dark pools in a clustering fashion, regardless of
σv. This is a more realistic prediction. If there are some assets for which dark pools only
attract liquidity traders, one would expect a persistent gap between the average size of dark
pools and the average size of lit markets. Yet, this is not true as we observe in Figure 2.
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Figure 9: Participation Rates. The left figure plots the expected participation rates of the uninformed
and how they vary with log(σe). The right one shows the participation rates for the informed traders how
they vary with log(σe). In both plots, log(σv) = 0, µz = 60, µ = 30.
This, again, emphasizes that dark pools function as informational risk mitigators and that
they are always lucrative for traders, informed or uninformed.
Second, Zhu (2014) predicts that informed traders’ participation in dark pool always
squeezes out liquidity traders (i.e., αd decreases as informed trades grow in the dark pool),
whereas we predict that the two can grow simultaneously, especially when informed traders’
information is relatively imprecise. The explanation is that the informed trading intensity
in the dark pool is always high in Zhu (2014) because traders have exact information. But
in our model, the intensity is neutralized to some extent because some speculators trade in
the “wrong” direction.
5.2 Dark Pool Impacts on Market Characteristics
In this section, we study how the market responds when a dark pool is added alongside an
exchange. Precisely, we compare the equilibrium traders’ participation and exchange spread
between the two models: the “Single-venue” model and the “Multi-venue” model. In the
comparison, we fixed the information structure (i.e., σe). The result is shown in Proposition
3. This result coincides with Zhu (2014), except that the effect on the exchange spread A is
uncertain when information is imprecise (i.e., σe high).
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Proposition 3. Given any σv, σe > 0, then adding a dark pool alongside an exchange a)
(Participation): decreases the participation in the exchange for both informed and unin-
formed traders, but increases the total market participation, and b) (Exchange spread):
widens the spread on the exchange, if information precision is high (σe is small).
That is, suppose µz
µ
≥ R
1−R
1
1−G(k̂) where R = E
[
min
{
1, R
+
R−
}]
, and k̂ is uniquely deter-
mined by k̂ = 1
1+[1−G(k̂]µz
µ
then
(i) (γe
S − γeS) ≥ (γe − γe), αSe ≥ αe, and if σe is sufficiently small or large, αSe ≤ αe + αd.
And,
(ii) A
S
σv
≤ A
σv
if σe is small.
Remark 2. When information precision is high (σe is low), as in Proposition 3, we proved
that A
S
σv
≤ A
σv
(i.e., adding a dark pool WIDENS the exchange spread). When information
precision is low (σe is high), however, it is possible that
AS
σv
> A
σv
(i.e., adding a dark pool
NARROWS the exchange spread ).32 This could be caused by the fact that, in these cases,
the informed traders have moved to dark pools so much that the information asymmetry
level in the exchange has deceased dramatically. While we discuss this briefly in Appendix
8.6, the explicit analysis is of future work.
Proposition 3 states that adding a dark pool will decrease informed and uninformed
traders’ exchange participation but increase the total participation. Thus, dark pools create
additional liquidity. This, again, is explained by the migration of traders. Because adding a
dark pool enlarges the opportunity sets for both informed and uninformed traders, there will
be migrations of both types of traders from both “Not trade” and “trade in the exchange” to
“trade in the dark pool.” Therefore, the dark pool attracts not only additional liquidity but
also part of the liquidity from the exchange. As a consequence, the exchange participation
decreases, but the total participation of traders increases. This is captured in figure 9 in
which αe ≤ αSe ≤ αe + αd.
The impact of a dark pool to the exchange spread, however, is not straightforward.
The spread depends on the level of information asymmetry in the exchange, which in turn
depends on the intensity of informed and uninformed trades. As we have pointed out, the
addition of a dark pool induces an outflow of both informed and uninformed traders. The
resulting proportion of the two in the exchange depends on which overwhelms the other.
When the informed traders have high information precision (i.e., low σe), a large fraction of
them strictly prefers to stay in the exchange, and only a small fraction will migrate to the
dark pool, compared with the migration of uninformed traders. As a result, the exchange
information asymmetry strictly increases and exchange spread, “ A
σv
,” is enlarged. When the
32When σe is large, it is either
AS
σv
< Aσv when σe is large, or undetermined (in which, as σe → +∞, A
S
σv
equals Aσv , and their first order derivatives with respective to σe are equal. )
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informed traders have low precision in their information (i.e., σe is high), however, there is
a large fraction of the informed who prefer to migrate to the “buffer zone,” the dark pool,
and the relative proportion of informed traders in the exchange decreases. As a result, the
exchange spread may or may not decrease, depending on how intense the migration is.33
5.3 Dark Pool Impacts on Price Discovery
Price discovery is measured by the informativeness of P1. At the end of period 1, the mar-
ket maker observes the period 1 exchange order flows Vb, Vs, which respectively represents
the “buy” volume and the “sell” volume and announces a closing price P1 = E[v˜|Vb, Vs].
P1 is perceived as a proxy for the fundamental value of the asset. This is so because
E[v˜|P1, Vb, Vs] = E[E[v˜|P1, Vb, Vs]|P1] = P1. We are interested in how informative P1 is,
that is, how close P1 is to the true value of the asset.
We consider similar measures as suggested by Zhu (2014). Without loss of generality, we
assume that the true value v˜ = +σv. Let the likelihood ratio
r = log
Pr(v˜ = +σv|Vb, Vs)
Pr(v˜ = −σv|Vb, Vs) = log
φz(Z
+ = 1
αe
[Vb − γeµ]) · φz(Z− = 1αe [Vs − γeµ])
φz(Z− = 1αe [Vb − γeµ]) · φz(Z+ = 1αe [Vs − γeµ])
.
And
P1 = σv Pr(v˜ = +σv|Vb, Vs) + (−σv) Pr(v˜ = −σv|Vb, Vs)
=
Pr(v˜ = +σv|Vb, Vs)− Pr(v˜ = −σv|Vb, Vs)
Pr(v˜ = +σv|Vb, Vs) + Pr(v˜ = −σv|Vb, Vs)σv
Therefore
P1 =
er − 1
er + 1
σv.
Clearly, if r is higher, P1 is closer to the true value σv. If r = +∞, then P1 = σv, in
which case P1 is completely informative. Therefore, r can be considered as a measure of the
informativeness.
Another measure of informativeness that we consider is the scaled root-mean-squared
error (RMSE), in which
RMSE =
[E[(v˜ − P1)2|v˜ = σv]].5
σv
= E
[
4
(er + 1)2
|v˜ = σv
]
.
It is scaled by σv. Since r ∈ (0, 1), the scaled pricing error (RMSE) is between 0 and 1. If
RMSE is higher, there are more pricing errors, and there is less price discovery.
33Note that Aσv depends on both
γe−γe
γe+γe
and
γe−γe
αe
, when σe is large,
γe−γe
αe
decreases when adding a dark
pool but not necessarily
γe−γe
γe+γe
. The overall effect on Aσv is uncertain.
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Since Vb, Vs are random variables, r is also a random variable. When µz, σ
2
z are large
enough, we can approximate the density of φz(·) by a normal distribution N (.5µz, .5σ2z).34
Substituting the density functions, we get an approximate r by
rApprox =
2(γe − γe)µ
α2eσ
2
z
(Vb − Vs).
Given that v˜ = σv, Since Vb − Vs has a distribution of N
(
(γe − γe)µ, α2eσ2z
)
, so rApprox
has a distribution of
N (2I(γe, γe, αe)2, 4I(γe, γe, αe)2) ,
where
I(γe, γe, αe) =
(γe − γe)µ
αeσz
.
Thus, the magnitude of I(γe, γe, αe) can be taken as a measure of the price discovery
in the exchange. To be consistent with definitions of Zhu (2014), we also refer to it as
“signal-to-noise” ratio. We consider two measures of price discovery: the signal-to-noise
ratio I(γe, γe, αe) and the scaled RMSE under the normal approximation.
By the same argument as Zhu (2014), under the normal approximation, a higher signal-
to-noise ratio I(γe, γe, αe) always corresponds to a lower scaled RMSE. That is, they are in
nature the same measure. Therefore, we only plot the “signal-to-noise” in our numerical
example in Figure 10.
We introduce a measure for the informed traders: that is, the measure of their “informa-
tion advantage”:
σ =
σv
σe
.
An informed speculator’s “information advantage” is defined as the asset’s fundamental
uncertainty σv times the precision of the signals
1
σe
. Clearly, a higher σv reflects a high
level of undisclosed information, therefore, a higher profitability of the informed speculators.
Also, a lower σe means a higher precision of the private information, and hence a higher
informational profit. Proposition 4 summarizes the price discovery as a function of σ and
the impact of a dark pool to price discovery.
Proposition 4. Price discovery (i.e. the informativeness of P1) in the exchange is an in-
creasing function of informed traders’ “information advantage” (σ). And, there exists a
threshold, σ¯ > 0, such that, a) when σ < σ¯, adding a dark pool impairs price discovery,
and b) when σ is large, adding a dark pool enhances price discovery.
That is, suppose k̂ ≤ µz
µ
< +∞, where k̂ is uniquely determined by k̂ = 1
1+[1−G(k̂]µz
µ
, then
I(γe, γe, αe), I(γeS, γeS, αSe) increase in σ and RMSE, RMSES decrease in σ, when σe > 0 is
large enough, and ∃σ¯ > 0 such that
34We use the same approximation as in Zhu (2014), in which it shows that when µz and σ
2
z are large
enough, Z+ is approximately normal.
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(i) if σ ∈ (0, σ¯), adding a dark pool will strictly decrease the informativeness of the price in
exchange, that is, I(γe, γe, αe) < I(γeS, γeS, αSe) , and RMSE > RMSES
(ii) if σ is sufficiently large, adding a dark pool will increase the informativeness of the price
in exchange, that is, I(γe, γe, αe) ≥ I(γeS, γeS, αSe), and RMSE ≤ RMSES
When a dark pool is added alongside an exchange, the impact on price discovery is
depending on the resulting ratio of informed traders and uninformed traders in the exchange.
As we have discussed in Section 5.2, when a dark pool is introduced to the market, it induces
migrations of both informed traders and liquidity traders from the exchange to the dark pool.
When σ is high, on average, informed traders have high profitability, a high proportion of
the informed would rather stay in the exchange, and only a small proportion migrate from
the exchange to the dark pool, compared with the liquidity traders. Therefore adding a
dark pool increases the “signal-to-noise” ratio and improves the informativeness of P1 in the
exchange. When σ is low, however, on average the informed have low profitability so that a
higher proportion would rather migrate from the exchange to trade in the “buffer zone,” the
dark pool, compared with the liquidity traders. This leaves a lower proportion of informed
traders in the exchange. The “signal-to-noise” ratio decreases and price discovery declines.
In Figure 10, the right plots “signal-to-noise” ratio as a function of σ = σv
σe
. It increases
with σ, indicating that informed traders’ trading intensity grows with higher “informational
advantage,” and hence price discovery increases. Introducing a dark pool alongside an ex-
change decreases price discovery when σ is low (i.e., σv is low or σe is high), and increases
when σ is high (i.e., σv is high or σe is low). The left further illustrates the dark pool impact
on price discovery in a 2-dimensional context (i.e., σv and σe). .
The results highlight an important effect dark pools have on price discovery – an amplifi-
cation Effect That is, dark pools enhances price discovery when it is high, whereas dark pools
impairs price discovery when it is low. An economy needs to be prudent in introducing dark
pools to its equity market, especially when the economy has a poor information environment
(low quality in information disclosure, poor legal systems and enforcement, etc.) We provide
a more detailed discussion in Section 6.3.
This result is in contrast with Zhu (2014), in which adding a dark pool strictly increases
the price discovery. According to our analysis, the important reason Zhu (2014) predicts a
strict increase is due to the fact that it assumes an extreme case where signals for informed
traders are perfect (i.e., σe → 0 in our model). As we have pointed out, when information is
in high precision (i.e., σe is low), the majority of the informed traders prefer the exchange,
where dark pools will attract relatively less fraction informed traders from the exchange,
compared with the liquidity traders, and leave a higher ratio of informed-to-uninformed
traders in the exchange, hence improve price discovery. Thus, Zhu (2014) is consistent
with our prediction. In reality, however, Zhu (2014)’s prediction may not hold because the
information structure is much richer and exhibits significant cross-sectional difference (we
34
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Figure 10: Price Discovery. The left plots the dark pool impact on price discovery with 2-dimension:
σv and σe. The right plots the “Signal-to-noise” ratio I(γe, γe, αe) as a function of σ =
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.
will discuss this in Section 6.3). Policies and measures should be tailored to this issue in a
different information environment.
Zhu (2014) also depicts a scenario when uninformed liquidity trader types are discrete. It
shows that in this case, to a large degree, price discovery will be harmed by the introduction
of dark pools because uninformed traders of discrete types are more likely to get “stuck”
in their original venues while some informed traders flow from the exchange to dark pools
and decrease price discovery. Our prediction corresponds to this scenario. In our prediction,
the discrete type and “stickiness”of uninformed traders will further increase the chance that
price discovery be harmed.
Determinants of the impact. From the perspective of a regulator, when introducing
dark pools, an important issue is what fraction of the assets will be harmed in their price
discovery. In order to answer that question, one should examine the determinants and the
overall impact dark pools have on price discovery.
We consider a proxy which we refer to as the “likelihood that dark pools harm price
discovery.”
σ¯v = sup
x>0
{
x|∀σv ∈ (0, x), I(γeS, γeS, αSe) > I(γe, γe, αe)
}
.
By Proposition 4, such σ¯v must exist. A higher σ¯v reflects a higher fraction of assets whose
price discovery will be harmed by adding a dark pool.
We consider two determinants. The first is the precision of traders’ private information,
the inverse of σe. Proposition 4 indicates that the likelihood dark pools harm price decreases
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with precision level. Another determinant we consider is the relative measure of informed
traders, µ
µz
. The effects of the two on σ¯v is summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. the likelihood that price discovery will be harmed by dark pool trading
(σ¯v) decreases in information precision, σe, and increases in the relative measure of informed
traders, µ
µz
.
That is, Suppose k̂ ≤ µz
µ
< +∞, where k̂ is uniquely determined by k̂ = 1
1+[1−G(k̂]µz
µ
, then
(i) σ¯v increases in σe. As σe → 0+, σ¯v → 0, and as σe → +∞, σ¯v → +∞. And,
(ii) for any sequence of {( µ
µz
)}, there exists a subsequence {( µ
µz
)n} such that as ( µµz )n increases,
σ¯v increases, also, as (
µ
µz
)n → 0+, σ¯v → 0.35
The numerical example is given in Figure 11. Proposition 5 states that dark pools are
beneficial for price discovery in an economy with a good information environment (i.e.,
high information precision and low size of informed traders), whereas they are bad for price
discovery in an economy with a poor information environment (i.e., low information precision
and high size of informed traders). Proposition 5 gives regulators insights into how to improve
the economy and informativeness of prices. Policies and measures can be taken to enhance
the market performance. Also, it points out important considerations for countries that are
going to allow dark pools and provides them a benchmark to measure market quality. More
details are in Section 6.3.
6 Discussion: Empirical and Regulatory
In this section, we provide a discussion about empirical implications and policy suggestions.
The discussion is intended to provide insight into seemingly contradictory results in the
empirical literature, as well as give exploration of channels for future research and regulatory
concern. In these analyses, the economic force we consider is the variation of the information
structure, more precisely, the informed traders’ “information advantage,” σ = σv
σe
, or the
information imprecision, σe, if σv is fixed. We refer to “good information environment” by
more precise information and less informed traders. Although we attempt to attribute the
difference of the findings to the different information structures, we preserve a conservative
interpretation in these predictions. In general, our model suggests that dark pool activity
and its impacts display significant cross-sectional variation and thus should be evaluated
differently in various economic environments.
35We cannot directly show that σ¯v increases in
µ
µz
, but we are able to show a upper bound of σ¯v that is
increasing in µµz .
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Figure 11: The Likelihood DPs Harm Price Discovery σ¯v. The left-hand figure plots the threshold
σ¯v as a function of the relative size of informed traders,
µ
µz
. The right-hand shows the threshold σ¯v as a
function of the information precision, − log(σe). On the left, log(σe) = 0. On the right, µµz = .2.
6.1 Measurement for information precision
This paper shows that the level of information precision is essential to determining the
impact of dark pools on price discovery. In this section, we provide a brief discussion about
the measurement for information precision and information environment.
In this paper, there are two factors to consider for an economy’s information environment:
the precision of (private) information and the number of informed traders. The notion of a
better information environment includes a higher precision in traders’ (private) information
and fewer informed traders.36 We discuss the respective measurement for information pre-
cision of individual stocks and for the information environment of the whole economy. The
former helps us to conduct the cross-sectional analysis for individual stocks while the latter
gives regulators guidance on regulating dark pool trades as a whole.
(1) For individual stocks, the measurement for the level of information precision include the
following aspects.
Firm characteristics. Researchers have found that firms with greater growth volatility
(such as high R&D firms, young firms), smaller size, or fewer analyst followers have lower
36Private information is not necessarily insider information. A big fraction of it is information that is
publicly available but hard to collect, transmit, and process by the majority of the public.
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informational precision in traders’ informational predictions (Li et al. 2012, Maffett 2012,
Lang and Lundholm 1993, Baginski and Hassell 1997). Therefore, a firm’s age, size, number
of analyst followers, R&D ratios, and other measures regarding its growth volatility can
be used as proxies for the firm’s (equity’s) level of information precision. In addition to
that, researchers use analysts’ forecast variation and errors to proxy the level of information
precision among traders (Botosan et al. 2004, Gleason and Lee 2003).
Information acquisition and processing. The activity of information acquisition and
processing greatly affect the level of information precision. For example, Frankel et al. (2006)
has found that the informativeness of analysts’ reports greatly depends on how lucrative the
trades’ are and how costly is the information acquisition. Generally, a more lucrative and
matured financial market, with more competition, more innovation in trading technologies,
and years of trade has a higher level of trader ability for information acquisition and process-
ing (Louis et al. 2014, Clement 1999, Chen et al. 2005). Therefore, measures about the firms’
profitability, maturity, industry competition, level of innovation, and number (and years) of
traders can be used as proxies for individual stocks’ information precision.
(2) For the measurement of information environment in the macro-setting, measurements
include measures on the strength of legal institutions and law enforcement against insider
trading, the functionality of the public disclosure system, and the availability and efficiency
of media transmission. Generally, public disclosure and media channels can enhance the
precision of informed traders’ forecasts37 and stronger legal systems can significantly reduce
the number of insiders.
6.2 A Summary of Testable Empirical Predictions
1. Dark pool execution probability. We predict that dark pool non-execution proba-
bility increases with information precision (i.e. 1 − R¯+R
2
increases as σe decreases). Also,
an asset’s exchange spread increases with its dark pool non-execution probability (i.e. A
σv
increases in 1− R¯+R
2
).
This prediction suggest that the trade-off of dark pools is higher in an economy with
a good information environment. The trade-off is documented in many empirical papers.
For example, Gresse (2006), Conrad et al. (2003), Næs and Ødegaard (2006) , and Ye
(2010) study crossing networks in the US and conclude that dark pools, in comparison
with exchanges, have lower trading costs (within spread price) but higher non-execution
probability. He and Lepone (2014) studied Australia’s Centre Point dark pool and found
that the dark pool execution probability increases with dark pool activity. In contrast, Kwan
37Although there is a debate regarding the association between public and private information, researchers
generally find that public disclosures may be processed into private information by informed investors, and
there is a positive correlation between the precisions of public and private information. See Botosan et al.
(2004) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994).
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et al. (2015) find that the dark pool execution probability increases in the trading friction
in exchanges: the minimal price improvement.
The change of execution probability can be explained as follows: the execution depends
on two factors: traders’ total participation and dark pool information asymmetry level. The
former irons the difference between the two sides in the pool and increases the execution rate,
whereas the latter does the opposite. In the numerical example in Figure 12, we show that,
without pricing frictions in the exchange, the expected dark pool execution rate decreases
as the information becomes more precise (σe decreases).
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Figure 12: Execution Probability and Trade-off of A Dark Pool. The left figure plots the non-
execution probability as a function of log(σe). The right-hand figure plots the non-execution probability as
a function of the exchange spread A/σv. In both plots, log(σv) = 0.
2. Dark pool usage and market characteristics. All else equal, in an econ-
omy/industry/asset that has a high information precision, dark pool market share decreases
with information precision and with exchange spread, whereas in an economy/industry/asset
that has low information precision, dark pool market share increases with information pre-
cision and with exchange spread. More precisely,
(1) dark pool market share has an inverted U-shape relationship with the information pre-
cision,
(2) dark pool market share has an inverted U-shape relationship with the exchange spread.
The prediction follows from Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Remark 1. To measure
dark pool usage, we analyze the volumes in each venue. Since informed traders have no profit
to trade in period 2 due to the disclosure of information, they cancel their unexecuted orders
and leave the market in period 2. The remaining orders continue to execute in the exchange.
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The expected trading volume in the dark pool, in the exchange, and total consolidated
volume are, respectively:
Vd = (R¯γd +Rγd)µ+
R¯ +R
2
αdµz, (29)
Ve = (γe + γe)µ+ αeµz + (1− αe − αd)µz +
(
1− R¯ +R
2
)
αdµz, (30)
V = Vd + Ve. (31)
We distinguish the components of dark volumes by “Dark uninformed volumes” and “Dark
informed volumes” respectively as:
V Ud =
(
1− R¯ +R
2
)
αdµz, (32)
V Id = Vd − V Ud . (33)
Figure 13 illustrates equilibrium behavior of dark pool market share and dark pool “informed
volume” share. Though this prediction coincides with Zhu (2014), our model emphasizes the
A=<v
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
D
P
M
ar
ke
t
Sh
ar
e
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
Dark/Total
log(<e)
-4 -2 0 2 4
Vo
lu
m
e
0
100
D
P
M
ar
ke
t
Sh
ar
e
0
0.1
0.2
Dark Volume
Total Volume
Dark/Total
Dark Info/Total
Figure 13: Dark Volumes and Market Share. The left figure plots the dark pool volume, total volume
and dark pool market share as a function of log(σe). The right-hand figure shows the dark pool market share
as a function of the exchange spread A/σv. In both plots log(σv) = 0.
role of the trader’s information structure.
This prediction is consistent with Ray (2010) and Preece (2012), which report a similar
inverted U-shape between dark pool usage and exchange spread. Other empirical studies
have reported contradictory results using different datasets. For studies using different US
datasets, Hatheway et al. (2013) and Weaver (2014) find a positive association while O’Hara
and Ye (2011) and Ready (2014) find a negative association between dark trading and ex-
change spread. ASIC (2013) and Comerton-Forde and Putnin¸s˘ (2015) study Australian dark
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trading and find a positive relationship. Degryse et al. (2015) find a positive relationship
for European dark fragmentation. Our model suggests that such a relationship varies cross-
sectionally, depending on the specific information structure. The cross-sectional difference
is reflected in Nimalendran and Ray (2014), Buti et al. (2011b), and O’Hara and Ye (2011).
More cross-sectional studies that specify the characteristics of firms and countries are needed.
3. Information content of dark pool trades. In an economy with high information
precision, the information content of dark pool trades decreases with information precision
and with exchange spread. By contrast, in an economy low information precision, the infor-
mation content of dark pool trades increases with information precision and with exchange
spread. More precisely,
(1) the information content of dark pool trades has an inverted U-shape relationship with
the information precision,
(2) the information content of dark pools trades has an inverted U-shape relationship with
the exchange spread.
The prediction follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. We use two measures for the
dark pool information content. The first measure is the DP Predictive Fraction – the fraction
of dark pool volumes that are traded in the “right direction” (i.e., fraction of volumes that
predict the movement of prices). The higher the fraction is, the higher is the information
content of a dark pool. In this model, the Predictive Fraction is defined as
DP Predictive Fraction =
R(γdµ+ .5αdµz)
Vd
.
Another measure we consider is the normalized adverse selection costs, R¯−R. The inverted
U-shape of the two measures with the exchange spread is depicted in Figure 14. There are
relatively few studies that look at this issue. Peretti and Tapiero (2014) conclude that dark
pool trades can significantly forecast price movements. Nimalendran and Ray (2014) study
trades in a large crossing network and find that the information content in a dark pool is
positively associated with the exchange spread.
But as we point out, under different information environments, the dark pool informa-
tional content may differ cross-sectionally. Further study in this area is needed.
4. Impacts of adding a dark pool alongside an exchange. We predict that
(i) Liquidity externality. Adding a dark pool alongside an exchange decreases the ex-
change volume but increases the overall volume.
(ii) Price discovery and exchange spread. Dark pools have an amplification effect on
price discovery. That is, the introduction of dark pools enhances price discovery when price
discovery is high, and impairs price discovery when price discovery is low. Moreover, the
improvement of price discovery is associated with a wider exchange spread, whereas the
deterioration of price discovery can be associated with a wider or narrower spread.
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Figure 14: Predicability of Dark Pool Trades. The left figure plots the dark pool “Predictive Fraction”
as a function of spread A/σv. The right-hand plots the dark pool adverse selection costs as a function of
spread A/σv.
Prediction 4 follows directly from Proposition 3, Proposition 4 and Remark 2.38 Few studies
focus on the direct impact of introducing dark pool trading. For example, Hendershott and
Mendelson (2000) and Hendershott and Jones (2005) found that there was a reduction in
price efficiency after Island ECN stopped displaying its limit order book. Chlistalla and
Lutat (2011) finds that the entrance of Chi-X, a dark pool in the US, decreased spread.
Other research studies the relationship between price discovery and dark pool trading
intensity within the fragmented framework. O’Hara and Ye (2011) and Jiang et al (2012)
find a positive association between price discovery and dark pool trading, whereas Hatheway
et al. (2013) and Weaver (2014) find the opposite. Comerton-Forde and Putnin¸s˘ (2015)
conduct a more comprehensive cross-sectional study and show that, when the fraction of
non-block trades in dark pools is high (above 10%, suggesting that dark pools contain a high
fraction of informational orders), then dark trading harms price discovery, whereas if dark
pools contain less informational orders, dark trading improves price discovery. Comerton-
Forde and Putnin¸s˘ (2015)’s prediction is consistent with ours in the sense that we predict
an inverted U-shape for the relation of dark pool information content and the information
precision. More research is still needed on the important question of the effect of dark pool
activity on price efficiency for different types of stocks in the cross-section.
38Remark 2 points out, when private information is imprecise, it is possible that price discovery is decreased
while spread increases. If this is the case a dark pool can be strictly detrimental to the exchange.
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6.3 Regulatory Considerations
Price discovery is the essential economic function of an exchange. As Alan and Schwartz
(2013) point out, price discovery, as a public good, gives investors confidence and promotes
the interests of listed entities and the broader community through an efficient secondary
market for capital. More precisely, an exchange-produced price benefits a broad spectrum
of market participants who use it for marking to market, derivatives valuation, mutual-fund
cash flow estimation, estates, and dark pool pricing. Thus, the efficiency of how prices are
discovered becomes a serious matter in measuring market quality. In the periods of time
when markets are deeply fragmented by dark pool trading, it is of extreme importance for
regulators to be wary of the impacts dark pools have on price discovery.
1. What should regulators do? Regulators should be cautious in controlling dark
pool trading in order to not harm price discovery. To do that, regulators should examine the
following aspects. First, dark pool trading should be regulated to a level that distinguishes
firm characteristics. As we have pointed out, traders generally possess low precision for high
R&D firms, young firms, small firms, and less-analyzed firms. Introducing dark pools to these
firms might cause a decrease in price discovery. Second, a monitoring system measuring the
public’s ability to process information should be built, and dark pool trading should be
under dynamic revision. Third, countries should continue to improve their judicial system
to prevent insider trading, and, at the same time, take measures to improve the efficiency
of public disclosure, including accounting information enhancement and financial reporting
regulations. Countries should also ensure there are more effective financial media channels.
In general, regulators should improve countries’ information environment.
2, Dark pools in emerging markets? Based on current evaluations of the informa-
tion environment in several emerging markets, a great proportion of emerging markets are
governed by poor legal systems and have limited implemental power against insider trading
and poor quality of information disclosure. These countries should be extremely cautious in
dark pool trading. For example, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) found that the enforcement
of insider trading laws in 81 emerging markets is significantly low compared with developed
countries. Wang and Wu (2011) and Yu and Lu (2009) document poor quality of financial
information in mainland China, and they show that up to a quarter of listed firms in main-
land China explicitly admitted to the poor quality of their financial information by restating
their previous financial reports. Tang et al. (2013) finds that a poor corporate governance
system interacts with abnormal insider trading to aggravate the information environment
in Taiwan. Budsaratragoon et al. (2012) tests insider trading regulations in Thailand and
find that severe informational asymmetry, lax enforcement and poor pricing efficiency are
endemic. As we point out, dark pools have an amplification effect on price discovery, so
introducing dark pool trading in those countries may aggravate the situation.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of dark pools on price discovery in a noisy information frame-
work. We find that the addition of a dark pool to the traditional exchange has an amplifica-
tion effect on price discovery, i.e., it enhances price discovery when the information has high
precision and impairs price discovery when the information has low precision. The results
reconcile the conflicting empirical findings in current literature and suggest new channels of
research to disentangle the relationship between dark pool trading and market quality.
We highlight the dark pool’s function as an informational risk mitigator. In equilibrium,
information is sorted by market fragmentation. That is, traders with strong signals trade
in the exchange, traders with modest signals trade in the dark pool, and traders with weak
signals do not trade. When information precision is low, a large proportion of informed
traders with modest signals crowd in the dark pool to reduce their information risk. Adding
a dark pool, thus, shifts a higher fraction of informed traders from the exchange, compared
with liquidity traders, leaving a lower informed-to-uninformed ratio in the exchange and thus
decreasing price discovery. In contrast, when information precision is high, a large proportion
of informed traders with strong signals crowd in the exchange. Adding a dark pool shifts
only a small fraction of informed traders from the exchange, compared with liquidity traders,
increasing the informed-to-uninformed ratio in the exchange and increasing price discovery.
There are several observations that complement the overall effects on market quality.
First, when information precision is low, the market can experience a deterioration of price
discovery along with a widened exchange spread. In this case, dark pools are strictly detri-
mental to the exchange. Second, dark pools always attract informed traders and liquidity
traders in a clustered fashion. We should observe both informed and uninformed traders
in all trading venues. Third, the ability of dark trades to predict price movement has an
inverted U-shape with exchange spread. Therefore, assets with modest exchange liquidity
have a high information content in their dark pool trades.
There are aspects regulators should be aware of. First, dark pools and their impacts have
significant variance cross-sectionally. The information structure of different assets, industries,
and countries differs in nature. The use of dark pools is thus case sensitive. Second, in
a deeply fragmented market, policies that help improve the information environment are
needed to enhance price discovery. These measures include, among others, enhancing public
disclosure by improving accounting and reporting regulations, strengthening legal systems,
and implementing laws against insider trading.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Since each trader is infinitesimal and orders are limited by the amount, his or her action
has no impact on the market parameters (i.e., the exchange spread A and the dark pool
execution probabilities (R¯, R)). Therefore, splitting the order cannot affect the (per unit)
profit in each venue. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case of a positive signal
(the case for a negative signal is similar). Suppose that the informed traders have signal
s > 0. Then he has a belief B(s) > 1
2
. Because the profit of a “Buy” order in each venue
is strictly higher than the profit of a “Sell” order, thus it is optimal to choose the “Buy”
direction. From his or her perspective, given the exchange spread A and the dark pool
execution probabilities (R¯, R), the expected (per unit) profit for trading in the lit market,
dark pool, and not trade depends on his or her confidence level B(|s|) and is determined by
(5), (6), and (7), respectively.
Because these payoffs are linear in B(|s|), given any belief B(|s|), there is always one
venue that is no worse than any of other venues. This relationship is shown in Figure 5a.
When s 6= ±s0 or ± s1, the payoff of trading in one venue is strictly better than others, and
it is optimal to send the entire order to that venue. When s = ±s0 or ± s1, there are two
venues that yield the same payoff, and the trader can choose to split the order or not between
these two venues. However, since the realization of the signal among the informed traders
are continuously distributed, the measure of informed traders who receive a particular signal
is zero. That is, such traders who are indifferent to these two venues has a mass of zero in
the market. Therefore, in probability one, all informed traders send entire order to either
the exchange or the dark pool, or not trader at all.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From a type d liquidity trader’s perspective, the expected per unit payoff from trading in
the lit market, dark pool, and completely deference are determined by (8), (9), and (10),
respectively. Since each individual has no impact to the market, given A, R¯, R, the per
unit payoff in each venue is fixed. There is always one venue that is no worse than others.
In addition, the payoff is linear in the number of units transacted. Hence there is no need
to split among different venues or among different periods.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Hereafter we normalize some variables via dividing by σe, i.e., let s =
s
σe
, s0 =
s0
σe
, s1 =
s1
σe
,
ŝ = ŝ
σe
, σ = σv
σe
. Then it is equivalent to prove that, given σ ≥ 0, there is a unique cut-off ŝ
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such that hSI(s), h
S
U,ι(d), A
S, γe
S, γe
S, αSe consist a equilibrium, in which
hSI(s) =

(“Buy”, Exchange(Lit)) if s ≥ ŝ,
(“Sell”, Exchange(Lit)) if s < −ŝ,
Not trade otherwise,
(34)
hSU,ι(d) =
{
(“Buy” if ι=Buyer, or “Sell” if ι=Seller, Exchange(Lit)) if d ≥ 2B(ŝ)− 1,
Delay trade otherwise,
(35)
γe
S = 1− Φ(ŝ− σ), (36)
γe
S = 1− Φ(ŝ + σ), (37)
αSe = 1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1), (38)
AS
σv
=
γe
S − γeS
γe
S + γeS + αSe
µz
µ
, (39)
where ŝ is determined by
2B(ŝ)− 1 = A
S
σv
. (40)
We prove the theorem in two steps. First, we show that if ŝ is given, the other variables
hSI(s), h
S
U,ι(d), A
S, γe
S, γe
S, αSe solved from (34)-(39) form an equilibrium. Then we show
that such ŝ exists and is unique.
Suppose that ŝ exists. By (40), an informed trader with signal ŝ is indifferent between
trading in the exchange and not trade. Since B(s) is increasing in s, hSI(s) is an optimal
strategy for informed traders. Similarly, since a type d̂ = 2B(ŝ) − 1 uninformed liquidity
trader is indifferent between trading on the exchange and deferring trade, hSU,ι(d) is an optimal
strategy for uninformed traders. By the law of large numbers, given hSI(s) and h
S
U,ι(d), the
fraction of uninformed traders who trade in the exchange would be αSe = Pr(d ≥ d̂) =
1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1). Thus, the fraction of informed traders who trade in the “right direction”
would be γe
S = Pr(s ≥ ŝ) = 1 − Φ(ŝ − σ), and the fraction of informed traders who trade
in the “wrong direction” would be γe
S = Pr(s < ŝ) = 1 − Φ(ŝ + σ). In addition, for given
γe
S, γe
S, αSe , we can find A
S from (39) and it would make the market maker on the exchange
breaks even on average. Thus, hSI(ŝ), h
S
U,ι(d), A
S, γe
S, γe
S, αSe indeed form an equilibrium.
Then we will prove that such ŝ exists and is unique. After substituting the expressions
of AS, γe
S, γe
S, αSe into (40), we obtain the following equation for ŝ:
Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ)
2− Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ) + (1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1))µz
µ
= 2B(ŝ)− 1. (41)
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Define
f(s) =(2B(s)− 1)
[
2− Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ) + (1−G(2B(s)− 1))µz
µ
]
− [Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ)] ,
and the derivative of f(s) is
f ′(s) =2B′(s)
[
2− Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ) + (1−G(2B(s)− 1))µz
µ
]
− 2(2B(s)− 1)G′(2B(s)− 1)B′(s).
We can easily find that f(1
2
) < 0, f(+∞) > 0, f ′(0) > 0, f ′(+∞) = 0. Because G′(x) +
xG′′(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1], we have f ′′(s) < 0. Thus there exists a unique ŝ such that
f(ŝ) = 0.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Hereafter we normalize some variables via dividing by σe, i.e., s =
s
σe
, s0 =
s0
σe
,s1 =
s1
σe
,
ŝ = ŝ
σe
, σ = σv
σe
. Then finding the equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following system
of equations:
B(s0)(R¯ +R) = R¯, (42)
B(s1)
[
(1− R¯) + (1−R)] = A
σv
+ (1− R¯), (43)
R¯ = E
[
min
{
1,
γdµ+ αdZ
+
γdµ+ αdZ−
}]
, (44)
R = E
[
min
{
1,
γdµ+ αdZ
−
γdµ+ αdZ+
}]
, (45)
A
σv
=
γe − γe
(γe + γe) + αe
µz
µ
, (46)
γe = 1− Φ(s1 − σ), (47)
γe = 1− Φ(s1 + σ), (48)
γd = Φ(s1 − σ)− Φ(s0 − σ), (49)
γd = Φ(s1 + σ)− Φ(s0 + σ), (50)
αe = 1−G(2B(s1)− 1), (51)
αd = G(2B(s1)− 1)−G(2B(s0)− 1), (52)
where
B(s) =
φ(s− σ)
φ(s− σ) + φ(s + σ) . (53)
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Before proving the existence of solutions to the system of equations, we introduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let s0 ≥ 0 and s1 = s0 + , we have
lim
→0+
R = E
[
min
{
1,
φ(s0 + σ)µ+ 2G
′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z−
φ(s0 − σ)µ+ 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z+
}]
,
lim
→0+
R¯ = E
[
min
{
1,
φ(s0 − σ)µ+ 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z+
φ(s0 + σ)µ+ 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z−
}]
,
lim
→0+
A
σv
=
Φ(s0 + σ)− Φ(s0 − σ)
2− Φ(s0 + σ)− Φ(s0 − σ) + [1−G(2B(s0)− 1)] µzµ
.
Moreover, if s0 = 0 or σ = 0, then lim
→0+
R = lim
→0+
R¯ = 1. Therefore, we define R, R¯, and A
σv
use these limits when s0 = s1.
Proof. We can prove this by the Taylor expansion. Suppose that  is sufficiently small.
Because s0 ≥ 0 and s1 = s0+, we have, by the Taylor expansion, that γd = φ(s0+σ)+o(),
γd = φ(s0 − σ)+ o(), and αd = 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)+ o(). Therefore we have
R = E
[
min
{
1,
φ(s0 + σ)µ+ 2G
′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z−
φ(s0 − σ)µ+ 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z+ + o()
}]
,
R¯ = E
[
min
{
1,
φ(s0 − σ)µ+ 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z+
φ(s0 + σ)µ+ 2G′(2B(s0)− 1)B′(s0)Z− + o()
}]
.
Similarly, by the Taylor expansion, we have γe = 1 − Φ(s0 − σ) − φ(s0 − σ) + o(), γe =
1 − Φ(s0 + σ) − φ(s0 + σ) + o(), and αe = [1−G(2B(s0)− 1)] − 2G′(·)B′(s0) + o().
Therefore
A
σv
=
Φ(s0 + σ)− Φ(s0 − σ)− [φ(s0 + σ)− φ(s0 − σ)] 
2− Φ(s0 + σ)− Φ(s0 − σ) + [1−G(2B(s0)− 1)] µzµ − [φ(s0 + σ) + φ(s0 − σ) + 2G′(·)B′(s0)] 
+ o().
Let → 0+, and we prove the lemma.
We prove the theorem in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 1. First, we show that
if s0 and s1 are given, the other variables hI(·), hU,ι(·), A, R¯, R, γe, γe, γd, γd, αd, αe
solved from (44)-(52) form an equilibrium. Then we show that (s0, s1) exists and is unique.
Given A, R¯, R, γe, γe, γd, γd, αd, αe and that s0, s1 determined by (42), (43), 0 <
s0 < s1, we show that it is optimal for informed speculators and uninformed liquidity
buyers (and sellers) to following the strategy described respectively by hI(·) and hU,ι(·), ι ∈
{Buyer, Seller}.
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Consider an informed speculator who receives a signal s ≥ 0 (the case when s ≤ 0 is
symmetric with respect to the vertical axis, and hence the analysis is similar and skipped
here). Suppose that 0 < s0 < s1. From his or her perspective, the expected payoffs in
the lit market, the dark pool, and no-trade are, respectively, [B(s)σv − (1−B(s))σv] − A,
B(s)Rσv−(1−B(s))R¯σv, and 0. Figure 5a captures the payoff as a function of B(s). As one
can see in the graph, since the payoffs are linear with respect to B(s), and B(s) is strictly
increasing with respect to s, the optimal strategy for an informed speculator with signal s
should use the exchange (the lit market) to trade when his or her signal s ≥ s1, and the
dark pool when s0 ≤ s < s1, and stay outside when s < s0. This is marked as the red line
in Figure 5a.
The fractions of each type of traders in each venue γe, γe, γd, γd, αe, αd are determined
by (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52), respectively, and A, R¯, R are given by (46), (44), (45).
Thus properties (ii), (iii) and (iv) in Definition 2 are satisfied.
Then we need to show that such pair of cut-off (s0, s1) exists and satisfies 0 < s0 < s1. In
order to show this, we consider equations (42) and (43) and show that there is a intersection
for the two lines represented by these two equations.
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Figure 15: Equilibrium Existence
For equation (42), we show that (s0, s1) = (0, 0) satisfies equation (42) and behaves as
the black line in Figure 15.
(i) Suppose s0 = 0, s1 = 0, then B(s0) =
1
2
, and by Lemma 3, R¯ = R = 1. Therefore
equation (42) is satisfied.
(ii) Now suppose that s0 > 0, then
1
2
< B(s0) < 1. To satisfy (42), we need that R < R¯ ≤ 1,
thus |γd| < |γd|. To obtain this, it must be true that s1 > s0 if such s1 exists. By continuity
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such s1 must exist for a small enough s0. (Note that if s0 is too large, such s1 may not
exist.)
(iii) We also show that there exist some s such that s1 → +∞ when s0 → s. We
rewrite equation (42) as B(s0) =
R¯
R¯+R
. As s1 → +∞, γd → 1 − Φ(s0 − σ), γd →
1 − Φ(s0 + σ), αd → 1 − B(s0). Hence R¯ → E
[
min
{
1, 1−Φ(s0−σ)+[1−B(s0)]Z
+
1−Φ(s0+σ)+[1−B(s0)]Z−
}]
, and
R → E
[
min
{
1, 1−Φ(s0+σ)+[1−B(s0)]Z
−
1−Φ(s0−σ)+[1−B(s0)]Z+
}]
. Therefore, for any s0 ∈ [0,∞), there must exist
γd > γd, thus R¯ > R. Then let s1 → +∞, the left hand side of the equation, B(s0), is
equal to 1
2
if s0 = 0, and is equal to 1 if s0 → +∞. However, the right hand side of the
equation, R¯
R¯+R
, is greater than 1
2
if s0 = 0, and equal to
1
2
if s0 → +∞. This is because
lim
s→+∞
1−Φ(s0−σ)
1−B(s0) = lims→+∞
1−Φ(s0+σ)
1−B(s0) = 0, so lims→+∞
R¯ = lim
s→+∞
R = E
[
min
{
1, Z
+
Z−
}]
. By continu-
ity, there must exist an s ∈ (0,+∞) such that, as s0 → s, s1 → +∞, LHS = RHS. That is,
equation (42) is satisfied.
For equation (43). We rewrite it as
B(s1) =
A
σv
(1− R¯) + (1−R) +
(1− R¯)
(1− R¯) + (1−R) . (54)
(i) Suppose that s0 = 0, we prove that there must exist a s1 > 0 satisfy (43). Note
that for any given σ ∈ (0,+∞), A > 0 is satisfied. If s1 = 0, we have B(s1) = 12 and
R¯ = R = 1. Plugging into (43) gives us A = 0, which contradicts the fact that A > 0. If
s1 < 0, then B(s1) <
1
2
, γd < γd, and 0 < R¯ < R < 1 (we don’t consider any R¯, R < 0).
Hence (1−R¯)
(1−R¯)+(1−R) >
1
2
> B(s1). In order for (43) to be satisfied, we have A < 0, which
contradicts with that fact that A > 0. Then we show the existence of s1 using the continuity
of equation (54). Its left hand side B(s1) is increasing in s1 and B(0) =
1
2
, lim
s1→∞
B(s1) = 1.
If s1 = 0, the right hand side equals
A
σv
(1−R¯)+(1−R) +
1
2
> 1
2
. However, when s1 → ∞, we
have A → 0 and 1 > R¯ > R, hence the right hand side equals 0 + 1−R¯
(1−R¯)+(1−R) <
1
2
. By
the continuity of equation (54), there must exist a s1 ∈ (0,+∞) such that the equation is
satisfied.
(ii) Next we prove that there exist an s > 0 and small enough  > 0 such that for s0 =
s, s1 = s + , equation (43) is satisfied as  → 0+. Consider any s0 = s, s1 = s + , when
 > 0 is sufficiently small. By Lemma 3, equation (43) is equivalent to
B(s) =
A
σv
(1− R¯) + (1−R) +
(1− R¯)
(1− R¯) + (1−R) , (55)
where A
σv
= Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
2−Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)+[1−G(2B(s)−1)]µz
µ
, R = E
[
min
{
1, φ(s−σ)µ+2G
′(2B(s)−1)B′(s)Z+
φ(s+σ)µ+2G′(2B(s)−1)B′(s)Z−
}]
, and
R¯ = E
[
min
{
1, φ(s+σ)µ+2G
′(2B(s)−1)B′(s)Z−
φ(s−σ)µ+2G′(2B(s)−1)B′(s)Z+
}]
. Consider s on [0,∞). The left hand side of
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equation (55) increases with respect to s. We have B(0) = 1
2
, and lim
s→∞
B(s) = 1. Now
consider the right hand side of equation (55). By Lemma 3, we know that if s → 0+, the
limit of the right hand side is
A
σv
(1−R¯)+(1−R) +
1
2
> 1
2
. If s→∞, we have A→ 0 and 1 > R¯ > R,
hence the limit of the right hand side is 0 + 1−R¯
(1−R¯)+(1−R) <
1
2
. By continuity there must exist
a s ∈ (0,∞) such that equation (55) is satisfied at (s, s) (i.e., s0 = s1 = s).
The above argument can be summarized by Figure 15. Given σ > 0 fixed, the black curve
represents the (s0, s1) pairs that satisfy equation (42). It goes through the point (0, 0), is
always above the line s1 = s0, and s1 → +∞ when s0 → s. The red curve represents the
(s0, s1) pairs that satisfy equation (43). When s0 = 0, s1 ∈ (0,∞). And there exists some
s ∈ (0,+∞) such that s0 = s1 = s, satisfies equation (43). Then because all functions are
continuous, there must exist a pair (s0, s1), 0 < s0 < s1 < +∞, such that both equations
(42) and (43) are satisfied. It is the intersection of the black curve and the red curve in
Figure 15. The existence is then established.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
To prove Propositions 1 and 2, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4. Suppose s(σ) is continuously differentiable over (0,+∞), and lim
σ→0+
s(σ)σ = 0,
then
lim
σ→0+
(φ(s(σ) + σ)− φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = 0
lim
σ→0+
(Φ(s(σ) + σ)− Φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = 0
In addition,
(i) If lim
σ→0+
s(σ) = ±∞, |σs′(σ)| ≤ s(σ) for sufficiently small σ.
(ii) If −∞ < lim
σ→0+
s(σ) < +∞, lim
σ→0+
σs′(σ) = 0.
Proof. (i) Suppose that lim
σ→0+
s(σ) = +∞. There exists  > 0 such that ∀σ ∈ (0, ), s(σ)σ >
0 and d(s(σ)σ)
dσ
> 0. Thus d(s(σ)σ)
dσ
= σs′(σ) + s(σ) ≥ 0, and
|σs′(σ)| ≤ |s(σ)|,
for σ ∈ (0, ). Similarly, if lim
σ→0+
s(σ) = −∞, we have that
|σs′(σ)| ≤ |s(σ)|,
for sufficiently small σ.
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Therefore, by mean value theorem, we have
lim
σ→0+
(φ(s(σ) + σ)− φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = lim
σ→0+
∫ s(σ)+σ
s(σ)−σ
−xe−x
2
2 dxs′(σ)
= lim
σ→0+
− 2σs(σ)e− s(σ)
2
2 s′(σ).
Because |σs′(σ)| ≤ |s(σ)| and lim
σ→0+
∣∣∣−2s(σ)2e− s(σ)22 ∣∣∣ = 0, we obtain
lim
σ→0+
(φ(s(σ) + σ)− φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = 0.
Similarly, we have
lim
σ→0+
(Φ(s(σ) + σ)− Φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = lim
σ→0+
∫ s(σ)+σ
s(σ)−σ
e−
x2
2 dxs′(σ)
= lim
σ→0+
2σe−
s(σ)2
2 s′(σ).
Additionally, lim
σ→0+
∣∣∣−2s(σ)e− s(σ)22 ∣∣∣ = 0 gives us that
lim
σ→0+
(Φ(s(σ) + σ)− Φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = 0.
(ii) Suppose that lim
σ→0+
s < +∞. On one hand, we have that lim
σ→0+
d(s(σ)σ)
dσ
= lim
σ→0+
σs′(σ)+
lim
σ→0+
s(σ) = lim
σ→0+
σs′(σ) + s(0). On the other hand, we have
d(s(σ)σ)
dσ
∣∣
σ=0
= lim
σ→0+
s(σ)σ − 0
σ − 0 = s(0). (56)
Thus we have
lim
σ→0+
σs′(σ) = 0,
and
lim
σ→0+
(φ(s(σ) + σ)− φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = lim
σ→0+
∫ s(σ)+σ
s(σ)−σ
−xe−x
2
2 dxs′(σ)
= lim
σ→0+
(−2σs′(σ)) · lim
σ→0+
s(σ)e−
s(σ)2
2
= 0,
lim
σ→0+
(Φ(s(σ) + σ)− Φ(s(σ)− σ)) s′(σ) = lim
σ→0+
∫ s(σ)+σ
s(σ)−σ
−xe−x
2
2 dxs′(σ)
= lim
σ→0+
(σs′(σ)) · lim
σ→0+
e−
s(σ)2
2
= 0.
56
Lemma 5. lim
σ→0+
ŝ = s∗, where s∗ ∈ (0,+∞) is determined by the following equation
s =
2φ(s)
2− 2Φ(s) + µz
µ
.
Proof. Because G(·), Φ(·) ∈ C2. The implicit function theorem and the uniqueness of ŝ
show that ŝ(σ) is a continuously differentiable function over (0,+∞).
When σ = 0, we have γe
S − γeS = 0 and ASσv = 0. Equation (40) gives us that B(ŝ) = 12
and ŝ(σ)σ = 0.
Recall that
AS
σv
=
Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ)
2− Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ) + (1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1))µz
µ
, (57)
G(·), Φ(·) ∈ C2, and AS
σv
is differentiable of σ over (0,+∞).
Taking the derivative, we get
d
(
AS
σv
)
dσ
=
(φ(ŝ + σ)− φ(ŝ− σ)) dŝ
dσ
+ (φ(ŝ + σ) + φ(ŝ− σ))
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
+
[Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ)] [(φ(ŝ + σ) + φ(ŝ− σ)) dŝ
dσ
+ (φ(ŝ + σ)− φ(ŝ− σ))][
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
]2
+
2G′(2B(ŝ)− 1)µz
µ
[Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ)]
(
∂B(ŝ)
∂ŝ
dŝ
dσ
+ ∂B(ŝ)
∂σ
)
[
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
]2 .
Lemma 4 gives us
lim
σ→0+
d
(
AS
σv
)
dσ
= lim
σ→0+
2φ(ŝ)
2− 2Φ(ŝ) + µz
µ
. (58)
On the other hand, from equation (40), we have
AS
σv
= 2B(ŝ)− 1.
Taking derivative with respect to σ, we get
d
(
AS
σv
)
dσ
= 2B(ŝ) [1−B(ŝ)]
(
2σ
dŝ
dσ
+ 2ŝ
)
.
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Using Lemma 4 and lim
σ→0+
ŝ(σ)σ = 0, we obtain
lim
σ→0+
d
(
AS
σv
)
dσ
= lim
σ→0+
(
σ
dŝ
dσ
+ ŝ
)
. (59)
Combing equations (59) and (58), we have that
lim
σ→0+
(
σ
dŝ
dσ
+ ŝ
)
= lim
σ→0+
2φ(ŝ)
2− 2Φ(ŝ) + µz
µ
.
Suppose that lim
σ→0+
ŝ = +∞, then we have, as we do in the proof of Lemma 4, lim
σ→0+
σ dŝ
dσ
+
ŝ > 0, which contradicts with lim
σ→0+
2φ(ŝ)
2−2Φ(ŝ)+µz
µ
= 0.
Then we have to show that the limit can not be zero. Because the limit can not be
infinity, we have lim
σ→0+
σs′(σ) = 0 from Lemma 4. Let f(s) = 2φ(s)
2−2Φ(s)+µz
µ
− s. We can check
that there is a unique s∗ ∈ (0,+∞) such that f(s∗) = 0. Therefore,
lim
σ→0+
ŝ = s∗ ∈ (0,+∞).
We then proceed to prove the propositions.
Case I: Without a dark pool
By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, A
S
σv
, α̂e, γe
S, γe
S are differentiable functions of σ, and
lim
σ→0+
d
(
AS
σv
)
dσ
= s∗ ∈ (0,+∞).
Also, taking derivative of B(ŝ) with respect to σ, we get
dB(ŝ)
dσ
=
∂B(ŝ)
∂ŝ
dŝ
dσ
+
∂B(ŝ)
∂σ
= B(ŝ) (1−B(ŝ))
(
2σ
dŝ
dσ
+ 2ŝ
)
. (60)
and the derivative of α̂e is
dα̂e
dσ
= −G′(2B(ŝ)− 1)B(ŝ) (1−B(ŝ))
(
2σ
dŝ
dσ
+ 2ŝ
)
.
When σ is sufficiently small, we get
lim
σ→0+
dα̂e
dσ
= −G
′(0)s∗
2
∈ (−∞, 0).
Similarly, we take derivative of γe
S − γeS with respect to σ and get
d
(
γe
S − γeS
)
dσ
= [φ(ŝ + σ)− φ(ŝ− σ)] dŝ
dσ
+ [φ(ŝ + σ) + φ(ŝ− σ)] ,
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and leting σ → 0+, we have
lim
σ→0+
d
(
γe
S − γeS
)
dσ
= 2φ(ŝ) ∈ (0,+∞).
Note that σ = σv
σe
, we conclude the following:
Given σ sufficiently small, as σv increases (or σe decreases),
(i) A
S
σv
strictly increases.
(ii) γe
S − γeS strictly increases, and αSe strictly decreases.
Case II, With a dark pool
Note that when σ = 0, we have γe = γe and γd = γd. Therefore
A
σv
= 0 and R¯ = R.
Equations (42) and (43) show that B(s0) =
1
2
and B(s1) =
1
2
. If 0 < σ < +∞, we have, by
Theorem 2, that 0 < s0 < s1 < ∞. Therefore, we have γe > γe, γd > γd, Aσv > 0, R¯ > R,
and 1
2
< B(s0) < B(s1) < 1. Then we are ready to conclude the following:
Given σ sufficiently small, as σv increases (or as σe decreases),
(i) A
σv
increases, and R¯−R increases.
(ii) γe − γe, γd − γd increases, αe decreases, and αd increases.
Let (s0, s1) be any equilibrium. Since G(·), and Φ(·) are twice differentiable, by the
implicit function theorem, there exist continuously differentiable functions s0(σ), s1(σ)
defined on (0,+∞).
When σ ∈ (0,+∞). By equation (42), we have B(s0) = R¯R+R¯ ∈ (0, 1). Thus rewrite it as
R¯
R
=
1
1
B(s0
)− 1 ,
and the derivative can be found as following:
d
(
R¯
R
)
dσ
=
1
R2
[
dR¯
dσ
R− dR
dσ
R¯
]
=
1
[1−B(s0)]2
(
∂B(s0)
∂s0
ds0
dσ
+
∂B(s0)
∂σ
)
=
B(s0)
1−B(s0)
(
2σ
ds0
dσ
+ 2s0
)
.
Also, we know lim
σ→0+
B(s0) =
1
2
and lim
σ→0+
R¯ = lim
σ→0+
R = 1, thus
lim
σn→0+
dR¯
dσ
− lim
σn→0+
dR
dσ
= lim
σn→0+
(
2σ
ds0
dσ
+ 2s0
)
.
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Equation (43) shows that
2B(s1)− 1−
[
B(s1)R− (1−B(s1))R¯
]
=
A
σv
.
Taking derivative on both sides, we get
d
(
A
σv
)
dσ
= (2−R− R¯)B(s0) [1−B(s0)]
(
σ
ds1
dσ
+ s1
)
+ [1−B(s0)] dR¯
dσ
−B(s0)dR
dσ
,
and because A
σv
= Φ(s1+σ)−Φ(s1−σ)
2−Φ(s1+σ)−Φ(s1−σ)+(1−G(2B(s1)−1))µzµ
, we have
d
(
A
σv
)
dσ
=
(φ(s1 + σ)− φ(s1 − σ)) ds1dσ + (φ(s1 + σ) + φ(s1 − σ))
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
+
[Φ(s1 + σ)− Φ(s1 − σ)]
[
(φ(s1 + σ) + φ(s1 − σ)) ds1dσ + (φ(s1 + σ)− φ(s1 − σ))
][
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
]2
+
2G′(2B(s1)− 1)µzµ [Φ(s1 + σ)− Φ(s1 − σ)]
(
∂B(s1)
∂s1
ds1
dσ
+ ∂B(s1)
∂σ
)
[
γe + γe + αe
µz
µ
]2 .
Similarly to what we shown in the proof of Lemma 5, we obtain
lim
σ→0+
d
(
A
σv
)
dσ
=
1
2
(
lim
σ→0+
dR¯
dσ
− lim
σ→0+
dR
dσ
)
= lim
σn→0+
(
σ
ds0
dσ
+ s0
)
, (61)
and
lim
σ→0+
d
(
A
σv
)
dσ
= lim
σ→0+
2φ(s1)
2− 2Φ(s1) + µzµ
. (62)
Combing equations (61) and (62) gives us
lim
σ→0+
(
σ
ds0
dσ
+ s0
)
= lim
σ→0+
2φ(s1)
2− 2Φ(s1) + µzµ
Suppose lim
σ→0+
s0 = +∞. Using the similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 5, we obtain
lim
σ→0+
(
σ ds0
dσ
+ s0
)
> 0. However, as s0 → +∞, we have s1 → +∞ and 2φ(s1)2−2Φ(s1)+µzµ → 0. This
is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that lim
σ→0+
s0 < +∞.
By Lemma 4, lim
σ→0+
σ ds0
dσ
= 0. So we have
lim
σ→0+
s0 = lim
σ→0+
2φ(s1)
2− 2Φ(s1) + µzµ
.
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Define lim
σ→0+
s0
4
= s0(0
+), lim
σ→0+
s1
4
= s1(0
+), and we have
lim
σ→0+
d
(
A
σv
)
dσ
= lim
σ→0+
s0 = s0(0
+) ≥ 0,
lim
σ→0+
d
(
γe − γe
)
dσ
= 2φ(s1(0
+)) ≥ 0,
lim
σ→0+
dαe
dσ
= −G
′(0)s1(0+)
2
≤ 0,
lim
σ→0+
dαd
dσ
=
G′(0)(s1(0+)− s0(0+))
2
≥ 0,
lim
σ→0+
d (αe + αd)
dσ
= −G
′(0)s0(0+)
2
≤ 0,
which conclude the proof.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove Proposition 3, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 6. For any given σ ∈ (0,+∞), ŝ(σ) < s1(σ).
Proof. Substitute the expressions of A
σv
into equation (40) and (43), then ŝ, s1 are respec-
tively determined by the following two equations
Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ)
2− Φ(ŝ + σ)− Φ(ŝ− σ) + (1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1))µz
µ
= 2B(ŝ)− 1,
Φ(s1 + σ)− Φ(s1 − σ)
2− Φ(s1 + σ)− Φ(s1 − σ) + (1−G(2B(s1)− 1))µzµ
= 2B(s1)− 1
− [B(s1)R− (1−B(s1))R¯] .
Let f(s) = Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
2−Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)+(1−G(2B(s)−1))µz
µ
, and its derivative is
f ′(s) =
D1(s) +D2(s)[
2− Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ) + (1−G(2B(s)− 1))µz
µ
]2 ,
where
D1(s) = (φ(s+ σ)− φ(s− σ))
(
2− Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ) + (1−G(2B(s)− 1))µz
µ
)
< 0,
D2(s) = − (Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ))
(
−φ(s+ σ)− φ(s− σ)− 2G′(2B(s)− 1)B′(s)µz
µ
)
> 0.
Since G′(s) + sG′′(s) ≥ 0, one can represent f(s) as the blue curve in Figure 16.
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Let ĥ(s) = 2B(s)− 1 and h(s) = 2B(s)− 1− [B(s)R− (1−B(s))R¯]. By equation (42),
for any s > s0, we have B(s) > B(s0) =
R¯
R+R¯
. That is,
[
B(s)R− (1−B(s))R¯] > 0.
Therefore ĥ(s) > h(s). In Figure 16, ĥ(s) is represented by the red curve, while h(s) is
represented by the green curve which is below ĥ(s). Obviously, the intersection point s1 is
larger than ŝ. The Lemma is proved.
 
 
 
 
 
1 
s1  s 
0 
𝑠 
R 
Φ(s+σ𝑣) -Φ(s-σ𝑣)   
2 − Φ(s+σ𝑣)-Φ(s-σ𝑣) +[1-G(2B(s)-1]
𝜇𝑧
𝜇  
 
2B(s) − 1 
2B(s) − 1 − [B(s)R − (1 − B(s))(1 −  ?̅?)] 
 
Figure 16: h(s) and ĥ(s)
Lemma 7. If σ → +∞, there exists a unique k̂ ∈ (1
2
, 1) such that lim
σ→+∞
γe
S = 1, lim
σ→+∞
γe
S =
0, lim
σ→+∞
αSe = 1−G(k̂), and lim
σ→+∞
AS
σv
= kˆ, where k̂ is determined by
k̂ =
1
1 +
[
1−G(k̂)
]
µz
µ
. (63)
In addition, such k̂ is smaller if µz
µ
is larger.
Proof. Suppose lim
σ→+∞
ŝσ = +∞. Then, when σ → +∞, we have 2B(ŝ) − 1 → 1. Thus
equation (40) gives us that A
S
σv
= 1. However α̂e = 1 − G(1) > 0, which implies ASσv < 1.
Therefore, we have
lim
σ→+∞
ŝσ < +∞.
Let lim
σ→+∞
ŝσ = Ĉ ∈ [0,+∞), where Ĉ will be determined later. Then we have lim
σ→+∞
ŝ =
0, thus lim
σ→+∞
(ŝ−σ) = −∞. Therefore, lim
σ→+∞
γe
S = 1, lim
σ→+∞
γe
S = 0. Let kˆ = lim
σ→+∞
2B(ŝ)−
1 = 1−e
−2Ĉ
1+e−2Ĉ
, and we have lim
σ→+∞
αSe = 1 − G(k̂) and lim
σ→+∞
AS
σv
= 1
1+[1−G(k̂)]µzµ
. However, kˆ has
to satisfy equation (63) such that equation (40) is satisfied.
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Let f(k) = k − 1
1+[1−G(k)]µz
µ
, and we can easily verify that f(0) < 0, and f(1) > 0.
Therefore, there exists a k̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(k̂) = 0, and Ĉ = 1
2
ln 1+k̂
1−k̂ .
Lemma 8. Let R = E
[
min
{
1, Z
+
Z−
}]
. Consider any equilibrium s0(σ), s1(σ) for σ → +∞.
We have lim
σ→+∞
s0σ < +∞. In addition, the limits of variables can be determined in the
following two statements.
(i) If lim
σ→+∞
s1σ < +∞, we have lim
σ→+∞
γe = 1, lim
σ→+∞
γe = 0, lim
σ→+∞
γd = 0, lim
σ→+∞
γd =
0, lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1 − G(k1), lim
σ→+∞
αd = G(k1), lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
= 1
1+[1−G(k1)]µzµ
, lim
σ→+∞
R¯ = R, and
lim
σ→+∞
R = R, where k1 ∈ (12 , 1) is determined by
(1−R)k1 = 1
1 + [1−G(k1)] µzµ
. (64)
(ii) If lim
σ→+∞
s0σ = +∞, we have lim
σ→+∞
γe = 1− k3, lim
σ→+∞
γe = 0, lim
σ→+∞
γd = k3, lim
σ→+∞
γd = 0,
lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1 − G(1), lim
σ→+∞
αd = G(1) − G(2k2 − 1), lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
= 1−k3
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
, lim
σ→+∞
R¯ =
k2
1−k2
[1−G(1)]µz
µ
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
, and lim
σ→+∞
R =
[1−G(1)]µz
µ
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
, where k2 ∈ [12 , 1) and k3 ∈ [0, 1) are
determined by
[1−G(1)] µz
µ
1− k3 + [1−G(1)] µzµ
= E
[
min
{
1,
Z−
k3
G(1)−G(2k2−1) + Z
+
}]
, (65)
k2 =
E
[
min
{
1,
k3
G(1)−G(2k2−1) +Z
+
Z−
}]
E
[
min
{
1,
k3
G(1)−G(2k2−1) +Z
+
Z−
}]
+ E
[
min
{
1, Z
−
k3
G(1)−G(2k2−1) +Z
+
}] . (66)
Proof. Consider any continuously differentiable functions s0(σ), s1(σ).
First we show lim
σ→+∞
s0σ < +∞ by contradiction. Suppose that lim
σ→+∞
s0σ = +∞, we
have B(s0) =
1
1+e−2s0σ → 1. Since s1 > s0, we have limσ→+∞s1σ = +∞, B(s1) =
1
1+e−2s1σ → 1.
In addition, Equation (42) gives us that R¯
R
= 1, i.e., R¯ = R.
If lim
σ→+∞
(s0 − σ) < +∞, then γd > 0 = γd, which is a contradiction to R¯ = R. If
lim
σ→+∞
(s0 − σ) = +∞, then lim
σ→+∞
s1−σ = +∞. Therefore we have lim
σ→+∞
γe = lim
σ→+∞
γe = 0,
lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
= 0, and by equation (43), we have lim
σ→+∞
B(s1) = lim
σ→+∞
1−R¯
1−R¯+1−R =
1
2
, whche is a
contradiction to lim
σ→+∞
B(s1) = 1. Therefore, we have
lim
σ→+∞
s0σ = C ∈ [0,+∞).
Then we show the two statements.
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(i) Suppose that lim
σ→+∞
s0σ = C0 ∈ [0,+∞) and lim
σ→+∞
s1σ = C1 ∈ [0,+∞), then we have
lim
σ→+∞
(s0 − σ) → −∞ and lim
σ→+∞
(s1 − σ) → −∞. Therefore, lim
σ→+∞
γe = 1, lim
σ→+∞
γe =
lim
σ→+∞
γd = lim
σ→+∞
γd = 0.
We show that lim
σ→+∞
R¯ = lim
σ→+∞
R = R. If C0 = C1, Lemma 3 and lim
σ→+∞
φ(s0−σ)
B′(s0)
=
lim
σ→+∞
φ(s0+σ)
B′(s0)
= 0 give us that lim
σ→+∞
R¯ = lim
σ→+∞
R = E
[
min
{
1, Z
+
Z−
}]
= R. If C0 <
C1, because lim
σ→+∞
γd = lim
σ→+∞
γd = 0 and lim
σ→+∞
αd > 0, we have lim
σ→+∞
R¯ = lim
σ→+∞
R =
E
[
min
{
1, Z
+
Z−
}]
= R.
Then equation (42) gives us that lim
σ→+∞
B(s0) = 1/2 and lim
σ→+∞
s0σ = 0. Let k1 =
lim
σ→+∞
2B(s1) − 1, and we have lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1 − G(k1), lim
σ→+∞
αd = G(k1) and lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
=
1
1+[1−G(k1)]µzµ
. Rewrite equation (43) in the following form
(2B(s1)− 1) (1−R) = 1
1 + [1−G(2B(s1)− 1)] µzµ
,
and k1 has to satisfy equation (64).
Let f(k) = (1 − R)k − 1
1+[1−G(k)]µz
µ
. We can verify that f(0) < 0 and f(1) > 0 if
1 + [1−G(1)] µz
µ
> 1
1−R . There is a k1 ∈ (0, 1) such that f(k1) = 0, and C1 = 12 ln 1+k11−k1 .
(ii) Suppose that lim
σ→+∞
s0σ = C2 ∈ [0,+∞) and lim
σ→+∞
s1σ = +∞. We have lim
σ→+∞
γe = 0,
lim
σ→+∞
γd = 0, and lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1−G(1).
Suppose taht lim
σ→+∞
(s1 − σ) = C3 ∈ [−∞,+∞]. Let k2 = lim
σ→+∞
B(s0) =
1
1+e−2C2 ∈
[1
2
, 1) and k3 = lim
σ→+∞
γd = Φ(C3) ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have lim
σ→+∞
γe = 1 − k3, lim
σ→+∞
γd =
k3, lim
σ→+∞
αd = G(1) − G(2k2 − 1), lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
= 1−k3
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
. Combining equations (42)
and (43), we have lim
σ→+∞
R¯ = k2
1−k2
[1−G(1)]µz
µ
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
, lim
σ→+∞
R =
[1−G(1)]µz
µ
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
. In addition, by
equations (44) and (45), k2 and k3 have to satisfy equations (65) and (66).
Suppose that 1+[1−G(1)] µz
µ
≤ 1
1−R . For equation (65), the left hand side is increasing
with respect to k3, while the right hand side is decreasing with respect to k3. In addition,
when k3 = 0, LHS − RHS = [1−G(1)]
µz
µ
1+[1−G(1)]µz
µ
− E
[
min
{
1, Z
−
Z+
}]
= 1 − R − 1
1+[1−G(1)]µz
µ
≤ 0,
and when k3 = 1, LHS − RHS = 1 − E
[
min
{
1, Z
−
1
G(1)−G(2k2−1) +Z
+
}]
> 0. Thus, given any
k2 ∈ [12 , 1), there exists a unique k3(k2) ∈ (0, 1) that solves equation (65). Furthermore, as
k2 increases, the right hand side of equation (65) decreases, thus k3(k2) is decreasing with
respect to k2. When k2 → 1, we have k3(k2)→ 0. Thus R→ [1−G(1)]
µz
µ
1+[1−G(1)]µz
µ
≥ 0.
For equation (66), we substitute k3 with the expression solved from (65), and it becomes
a function of k2 only. When k2 = 1/2, we have k3 ∈ [0, 1). Then LHS − RHS ≤ 0. While
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when k2 → 1, we have LHS −RHS ≥ 0. Therefore, there exist k2 ∈ [1/2, 1) and k3 ∈ [0, 1)
such that equations (65) and (66) are satisfied. Additionally, we have C2 =
1
2
ln k2
1−k2 , C3 =
Φ−1(k3).
We now proceed to prove the proposition. From Lemma 6, we have ŝ < s1 for all
σ ∈ (0,+∞). Thus, γeS − γeS = Φ(ŝ + σ)−Φ(ŝ− σ) > Φ(s1 + σ)−Φ(s1 − σ) = γe − γe and
αSe = 1−G(2B(ŝ)− 1) > 1−G(2B(s1)− 1) = αe.
Let k̂, k1, k2, k3 as in (63), (64), (65), (66). Suppose 1 − R > 11+[1−G(k̂)]µz
µ
, then as
σ → +∞, by Lemma 7, we have
lim
σ→+∞
AS
σv
=
1
1 +
[
1−G(k̂)
]
µz
µ
,
lim
σ→+∞
αSe = 1−G(k̂).
By Lemma 8(i), lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
= 1
1+[1−G(k1)]µzµ
and lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1 − G(k1). We can verify that
k̂ < k1 from equations (63) and (64). Therefore
1
1+[1−G(k̂)]µzµ
< 1
1+[1−G(k1)]µzµ
and 1−G(k̂) >
1−G(k1). That is, lim
σ→+∞
AS
σv
< lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
. We can easily verify that lim
σ→+∞
αSe < lim
σ→+∞
αe + αd.
By Lemma 8(ii), lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
= 1−k3
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
and lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1 − G(1). Then by equa-
tion (65), 1−k3
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
= 1−E
[
min
{
1, Z
−
k3
G(1)−G(2k2−1) +Z
+
}]
> 1−E
[
min
{
1, Z
−
Z+
}]
= 1−R.
Since we suppose that 1−R > 1
1+[1−G(k̂)]µz
µ
, we have that 1
1+[1−G(k̂)]µz
µ
< 1−k3
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
, that
is, lim
σ→+∞
AS
σv
< lim
σ→+∞
A
σv
.
Since k̂ < 1, k3 > 0, we proved that lim
σ→+∞
γe
S − γeS ≤ lim
σ→+∞
γe − γe, lim
σ→+∞
αSe ≥ lim
σ→+∞
αe.
Next we consider the case when σ → 0+. Recall that when σ = 0, we have AS
σv
= A
σv
= 0.
So we have to compare their derivatives at 0. From the proof of Lemma 5, we have that
lim
σ→0+
ŝ = lim
σ→0+
2φ(ŝ)
2−2Φ(ŝ)+µz
µ
, and lim
σ→0+
s0 = lim
σ→0+
2φ(s1)
2−2Φ(s1)+µzµ
. Since 2φ(s)
2−2Φ(s)+µz
µ
decreases in s, we
show that either lim
σ→0+
s0 < lim
σ→0+
ŝ < lim
σ→0+
s1, or lim
σ→0+
s0 = lim
σ→0+
ŝ = lim
σ→0+
s1. Therefore we
have two cases to consider. (i) lim
σ→0+
s0 < lim
σ→0+
ŝ < lim
σ→0+
s1. Since
d A
σv
dσ
increases in s when
σ → 0+, we have that AS
σv
< A
σv
, as σ → 0+. (ii) lim
σ→0+
s0 = lim
σ→0+
ŝ = lim
σ→0+
s1. In this case
dA
S
σv
dσ
=
d A
σv
dσ
, it is undetermined whether A
S
σv
< A
σv
or A
S
σv
> A
σv
, as σ → 0+. However, we cannot
distinguish between case (i) and case (ii).
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8.7 Proof of Proposition 4
As σ → +∞, we have lim
σ→+∞
γe
S−γeS = 1, and lim
σ→+∞
αSe = 1−G(kˆ). We consider the two case
in Lemma 8: (i) We have lim
σ→+∞
γe − γe = 1 and lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1−G(k1). Thus lim
σ→+∞
γeS−γeS
αSe
≤
lim
σ→+∞
γe−γe
αe
because kˆ < k1. (ii) We have lim
σ→+∞
γe−γe = 1−k3 and lim
σ→+∞
αe = 1−G(1). From
1
1+[1−G(k̂)]µz
µ
< 1−k3
1−k3+[1−G(1)]µzµ
, we have 1
1−G(k̂) <
1−k3
1−G(1) , i.e., Thus limσ→+∞
γeS−γeS
αSe
≤ lim
σ→+∞
γe−γe
αe
.
As σ → 0+, by Lemma 6, we have ŝ < s1, ∀σ > 0. Since γe
S−γeS
αSe
= Φ(ŝ+σ)−Φ(ŝ−σ)
1−G(2B(ŝ)−1) and
γe−γe
αe
= Φ(s1+σ)−Φ(s1−σ)
1−G(2B(s1)−1) , to show that
γeS−γeS
αSe
>
γe−γe
αe
for small σ, it is sufficient to show that
there exists σ¯ > 0, s.t. ∀σ ∈ (0, σ¯), Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1) decreases in s. If
µz
µ
< +∞, Lemma 5
gives us lim
σ→0+
s1 ≥ lim
σ→0+
ŝ > 0. Also, recall that lim
σ→0+
s1σ = lim
σ→0+
ŝσ = 0.
We now consider the derivative of Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1) with respect to s.
d
(
Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1)
)
ds
=
(Φ(s+ σ)− Φ(s− σ))G′(2B(s)− 1) e−2sσ
(1+e−2sσ)2
4σ
(1−G(2B(s)− 1))2
+
(φ(s+ σ)− φ(s− σ)) (1−G(2B(s)− 1))
(1−G(2B(s)− 1))2 . (67)
Let M = max
s∈[0,+∞]
[
4G′(2B(s)−1)
1−G(2B(s)−1) + 1
]
< +∞. If lim
σ→0+
s > 0 and lim
σ→0+
sσ = 0, there exists
σ¯ > 0, such that ∀σ ∈ (0, σ¯), s > Me2σ and sσ < 1. Therefore by the mean value theorem,
d
(
Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1)
)
ds
<
2σ [φ(s− σ)4G′(2B(s)− 1)σ + φ(s+ σ) (1−G(2B(s)− 1)) (−(s− σ))]
(1−G(2B(s)− 1))2
<
2σ
{
φ(s− σ)
[
4G′(2B(s)−1)
1−G(2B(s)−1) + 1
]
σ + φ(s+ σ)(−s)
}
1−G(2B(s)− 1)
=
2σ {φ(s+ σ)Me2sσσ − φ(s+ σ)s}
1−G(2B(s)− 1)
<0.
Thus ∃σ¯ > 0, such that ∀σ ∈ (0, σ¯), s ∈ [̂s, s1], we have d(
Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1) )
ds
< 0. Since ŝ < s1,
we have Φ(ŝ+σ)−Φ(ŝ−σ)
1−G(2B(ŝ)−1) >
Φ(s1+σ)−Φ(s1−σ)
1−G(2B(s1)−1) . We proved the proposition.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We need the follow Lemma to proceed the proof.
Lemma 9. ∀σ > 0, ∃C(σ) > 0, such that ∀0 ≤ s ≤ C(σ), d(
Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1) )
ds
> 0.
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Proof. Consider (67), ∀σ > 0, d(
Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1) )
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=0
> 0. Therefore, ∃C(σ) > 0 such that
∀0 ≤ s ≤ C(σ), we have
d
(
Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)
1−G(2B(s)−1)
)
ds
> 0.
First we show that σ¯v = sup
x>0
{
x|∀σv ∈ (0, x), γe
S−γeS
αSe
>
γe−γe
αe
}
is increasing in σe. Because
µz
µ
< +∞ and µz
µ
sufficiently large, according to Proposition 4, there must exist a σ̂ such
that σ¯ = sup
x>0
{
x|∀σ ∈ (0, x), γeS−γeS
αSe
>
γe−γe
αe
}
. By definition σ¯ = σ¯v
σe
, i.e., σ¯v = σ¯σe, where
σ¯ is a constant. σ¯v is increasing in σe. As σe → 0+, σ¯v → 0 and as σe → +∞, σ¯v → +∞.
Next we prove that if µz
µ
is large enough, there exists a subsequence {(µz
µ
)i} such that σ¯v
decreases as (µz
µ
)i increases.
Let C(σ) defined as sup
x
{
x
∣∣∀s ∈ (0, x), d(Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)1−G(2B(s)−1) )
ds
> 0
}
. By Lemma 9, such C(σ)
exists for all σ > 0. Note that if µz
µ
→ +∞, we have ŝ, s1 → 0. Therefore, as µzµ becomes
sufficiently large, there exists σ(µz
µ
), such that
ŝ, s1 < C(σ(
µz
µ
)).
Thus,
d(Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)1−G(2B(s)−1) )
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=ŝ
> 0,
d(Φ(s+σ)−Φ(s−σ)1−G(2B(s)−1) )
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=s1
> 0. And since ŝ < s1,
γeS−γeS
αSe
<
γe−γe
αe
This is to say, when µz
µ
is sufficiently large, we find a upper bound of σ¯, i.e., σ¯ < σ(µz
µ
).
Therefore, there exists a subsequence {(µz
µ
)i} such that, as (µzµ )i increases, σ(µzµ ) de-
creases, and σ¯ decreases, and as (µz
µ
)i → +∞, σ(µzµ )→ 0, σ¯ → 0.
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